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ABSTRACT: In the last two years, the major jurisdictions for equity trading, the 
U.S. and the E.U., introduced significant reforms in their market structure regulation, 
following diametrically opposite approaches. While the E.U. effort is deregulatory and 
decentralized, aiming to facilitate competition among marketplaces and enhance 
investors’ choices, the U.S. regulation limits competition in a critical respect: price. To 
understand this divergence and predict likely effects on the underlying markets, this 
paper compares the previous regimes in the two jurisdictions and their outcomes. It 
illustrates that European market participants in a fiercely competitive regulatory 
environment revolutionized their trading services and organizational structure. In 
contrast, innovation in the U.S. has been modest, largely due to the long-standing 
dominance of the New York Stock Exchange, a dominance reinforced by SEC rules 
limiting competition on price. As recent reforms strengthen the earlier choices of each 
jurisdiction, the paper argues that the US policy of limiting price competition extends 
past failures into future policies. The conclusions of this paper illuminate debates on the 





Setting the rules of the market is a primary challenge for every policy-maker: how 
far should regulatory intervention go, so as to safeguard the interests of consumers while 
preserving the dynamism of market competitors? The image of a stock exchange floor 
exemplifies the vitality of markets, representing the constant interaction of buyers and 
sellers to form prices and close trades. Besides serving as a site of competition for 
incoming investors’ orders, however, stock exchanges have also been engaging in 
competition with one another, as well as with other marketplaces, for the provision of 
trading services. Technological advances have allowed exchanges to expand their 
network beyond the confines of their physical locations, have facilitated the 
establishment of proprietary electronic trading systems that claim a significant portion of 
trading activity, and have provided new methods to disseminate trade information. This 
paper examines regulators’ efforts to intervene in this “market for markets” and their 
consequences for stock exchanges, financial intermediaries and ultimately investors. In 
particular, the paper discusses two major questions every regulatory design involves: how 
invasive regulation should be, and where the authority to determine the structure of the 
                                                 
∗ S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Professors Hal S. Scott and Howell E. Jackson for 
their very helpful suggestions and comments. I have greatly benefited from discussions with Professor 
Allen Ferrel, Jane Fair Bestor, Andreas Fleckner and Katerina Linos. A previous version of this paper was 
presented in the International Finance Seminar at Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Kate Brown 
and Apostolos Gkoutzinis, the discussants, as well as all participants in the seminar. Errors and omissions 
are entirely my own. 
  3market should lie. To assess how different approaches on these two issues affect the 
overall effectiveness of a regulatory system, this paper evaluates a system’s success in 
promoting innovation, an important (and leading) indicator of market efficiency. It shows 
that interventionist regulatory systems tend to favor certain market participants over 
others, thus shielding them from competitive pressures and reducing their incentives to 
innovate. Only under regulator pressure will such protected market participants introduce 
reforms that have benefited markets in other jurisdictions for years.     
The case of stock exchange market structure offers many advantages to research 
on the effects of regulation on advancing innovation in the underlying regulated industry. 
In the 1990s, the combined effects of rapid technological evolution and increasing 
globalization of finance triggered a series of developments in the stock exchange industry 
that put pressure on the existing market structure. These developments include growing 
cross-border trading volumes and increased institutional investor participation in the 
equity markets. In parallel, lower costs of entry in the market and speedier means of order 
execution permitted new entrants to challenge established market players and attract 
market share. In addition to market participants, regulators around the world also had to 
adjust their approach to the new realities of the marketplace. Responding to these 
developments, regulators in the two most important jurisdictions for equity trading, the 
U.S. and the E.U., made dramatic changes in the rules governing stock exchange market 
structure in the last two years. While both aimed to foster competition among trading 
venues, in practice they followed diametrically opposite approaches. In 2005, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted Regulation NMS (National 
Market System) that introduced detailed rules regarding the interaction of orders 
originating in multiple trading venues in the U.S. In contrast, the 2004 E.U. Directive on 
Markets in Financial Instruments (the “Directive”) required publicizing all information 
on trades relevant to market participants and did not include order interaction rules. This 
choice seems counterintuitive: in many policy fields, the U.S. has leaned towards 
lessening regulation and the E.U. has often been accused of devising burdensome 
regulatory schemes.  
To explain this surprising choice of regulatory design, this paper connects the 
current wave of regulatory initiatives with past policies regarding market structure in 
each jurisdiction. Since 1975, the U.S. has been building a system of detailed rules and 
mandated electronic linkages among markets, administered by a federal agency, the SEC. 
On the European side regulatory intervention in market structure had been minimal. 
However, in the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, European exchanges, operating in an 
environment of fierce competition with limited regulatory restraints, introduced 
substantial innovations in their trading and organizational models and completely 
transformed themselves in the process. In the meantime, the centrally mandated 
principles and infrastructure of the U.S. National Market System reinforced the 
advantages of major U.S. exchanges and left limited space to competitors seeking to gain 
market share by introducing innovative trading techniques. As major U.S. exchanges, 
thus shielded from competitive pressures, resisted specific commitments to innovation, 
the SEC was almost obliged by the circumstances to introduce regulatory changes that 
pushed reluctant exchanges towards long overdue reforms. Thus, greatly divergent 
policies pursued by these jurisdictions over the years allow a comparison of their 
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innovation.    
Academic debate in securities regulation has long sought an effective method to 
incorporate incentives for innovation in a regulatory framework primarily focused on 
investor protection. Scholars who have examined the optimal level of regulatory 
intervention in the equity trading markets appear divided: while some argue that specific 
characteristics of the equity trading industry, such as network dynamics or entrenched 
interest groups, justify a special role for regulation, others point to the risk of regulatory 
capture and criticize the current regulatory framework as overly restrictive of 
competition. Reform proposals for the securities industry focus instead on the allocation 
of regulatory authority in the global marketplace. These reformers argue that the absence 
of a centrally mandated regime for securities regulation will generate competition leading 
to greater innovation. By drawing a comparison between the U.S. and the E.U. 
experiences, this article shows that the E.U.’s deregulatory approach in market structure 
regulation has nurtured competitive forces that led European market participants towards 
greater innovation. Thus, it lends empirical support to the argument for deregulation. In 
addition, this paper contributes to the debate on where authority should be allocated by 
presenting the equity trading case in this context, and questions the soundness of the U.S. 
policy that assigns the role of market innovator to a federal agency.  
Following this introduction, Part I presents how market structure regulation is 
related to current debates on the impact of regulation on innovation across diverse fields 
and explains in more detail why a comparison between the U.S. and Europe makes sense. 
Part II traces the introduction of the National Market System by the SEC, identifies the 
establishment of centrally mandated inter-market linkages and the price priority principle 
as the main themes underlying the SEC policy and discusses their shortcomings. Part III 
examines the European market regime in the 1980s and the regulatory constraints it 
imposed on competition among exchanges. Part IV presents the resultant fierce 
competition among European exchanges, and their convergence on a common trading 
model and a common organizational structure. Part V presents developments in the U.S. 
in the same period and highlights the resistance of major market players to reform and 
innovation. Part VI analyzes the 2005 SEC Regulation NMS, which moves SEC policy 
towards further intervention by strengthening the price priority principle, and explains 
how pressure from the SEC pushed the NYSE to introduce reforms in its trading model 
much later than European exchanges. Part VII shows the Directive on Markets in 
Financial Instruments to reaffirm Europe’s confidence in letting competitive forces shape 
market structure. Part VIII summarizes the lessons drawn from this comparative 
discussion as to the effects of regulation on innovation and their impact on current 
academic debates. Part IX offers a conclusion. 
Part I.  Comparative Analysis of U.S. and E.U. Market Structure 
Regime and Current Academic Debates  
I.a.  Current Academic Debates on Regulation, Competition and Innovation in the 
Equity Markets 
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experiences of the Great Depression, providing adequate protection to investors has been 
the underlying rationale of the U.S. regulatory framework and the main goal of the SEC. 
The academic community has extensively debated whether greater regulatory 
intervention or deregulatory policies promote investors’ interests more effectively. To 
assess the successes and failures of each policy, scholars have often focused on 
innovation as a mechanism that improves market quality and as a leading indicator of 
market efficiency.   
However, academics are divided on whether the character of the securities 
industry warrants greater or lower levels of regulatory intervention. According to a first 
group of scholars, the network dynamics in the securities industry reinforce the 
advantages of the large and established market players, prevent market competition and 
require regulatory intervention to impose innovation.
1 For a second group of scholars, 
regulatory intervention to protect investors and promote innovation is necessary because 
entrenched interest groups threatened by innovation would otherwise block it.
2 In 
contrast, a third group of scholars argues against heavy regulation, for fear that 
established interest groups will capture the regulator and stifle innovative initiatives that 
harm their interests. This third group relies on the strength of special interest groups to 
explain the perceived failure of the SEC to bring innovation to the stock exchange 
industry and implement a Congressional mandate that they interpret as pro-competitive 
and deregulatory.
3 For this last group, the emergence of competitors to established 
exchanges should direct regulators towards lowering levels of intervention in the market, 
so as to strengthen competitive forces that will generate innovation and protect 
investors.
4 They criticize the current regulatory framework for secondary trading in the 
U.S. as overly restrictive.
5  
The debate on reform proposals mirrors the debate concerning theories of 
regulation in the securities market. Faced with the increasing internationalization of 
equity markets, scholars have focused on the allocation of regulatory authority in the 
                                                 
1 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
215 (2004).   
2 Professor Seligman notes that “. . . the SEC’s role in facilitating the creation of a National Market System 
was pivotal.” Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 82 (1984). See 
also Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake, Intermediaries’ or Investors’: Whose Market Is It Anyway?, 19 
J. CORP. L. 443 (1994); Dale Arthur Oesterle, Donald Arthur Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, The New York 
Stock Exchange and Its Out Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17 J. CORP. 
L. 223, 226 (1992). For a discussion of the role of exchange specialists on the NYSE floor, see infra text 
accompanying notes 13-14.   
3 See e.g. Jonathan R. Macey and David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National 
Market System, 1985 ILL. L. REV. 315 (1985).  
4 See Corrine Bronfman, Kenneth Lehn & Robert A. Schwartz, The SEC’s Market 2000 Report, 19 J. CORP. 
L. 523, 526-7 (1994). See also Paul Mahoney, The Stock Exchange as a Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 
1457 (1997).    
5 For example, Professor Laura Beny criticizes the current regulatory framework for its heavy reliance on 
the concept of an exchange as a natural monopoly, and its consequent overly interventionist and restrictive 
nature, and proposes increasing deregulation. See Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A 
Survey of Current Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 399 (2002).   
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6 For some, the absence of a centrally mandated regime for securities 
regulation will unleash competitive pressures to innovate. For example, building on what 
she views as the success of competitive federalism in U.S. corporate law, Professor 
Roberta Romano wants to allow foreign issuers to list in the U.S. while complying only 
with disclosure requirements and other listing rules of their country of incorporation.
7  
Other scholars want to give greater freedom to issuers. For example, Professors Stephen 
Choi and Andrew Guzman have proposed a portable reciprocity regime, which would 
allow issuers to freely choose a jurisdiction whose laws would govern the offering and 
offer securities in a foreign jurisdiction on a mutual recognition basis.
8 These proposals 
have sparked a heated academic debate questioning the merits of regulatory competition 
in the international securities markets.
9   
The comparison between two waves of U.S. and European regulation on market 
structure, assessed against their effects on the underlying markets, provides new insights 
for these academic debates. The lack of any substantive restraints to competition in the 
E.U. regulation allows us to observe whether a deregulatory policy can indeed bring 
innovation to the market, as its academic supporters argue, or whether it results in a 
market dominated by interest groups that resist innovation in order to protect 
themselves.
10 In the same fashion, European equity trading markets provide a real-life 
setting for examining the impact of decentralization of regulatory authority. Although 
there is no single European securities regulator, securities offerings, on which academic 
reformers have focused to date, are subject to a harmonized set of rules in Europe. In 
contrast, the equity trading markets have not been subject to harmonized rules and any 
reforms introduced by the Directive do not mandate specific market structure rules 
beyond transparency requirements. Thus, market competitors and national authorities had 
significant flexibility in shaping their systems and their rules. This E.U. approach can be 
usefully contrasted with the results of previous waves of U.S. regulation.  
 
I.b.  Why Compare the U.S. and the E.U. Equity Trading Markets? 
 
In the last three decades, the U.S. and the European stock exchange industry have 
experienced similar pressures resulting from a series of developments in the global 
financial markets. In particular, technological advances have allowed the introduction of 
automatic trading systems characterized by lower costs per trade, higher speed of 
execution (and today, immediacy of execution), and a greater ability to absorb an ever 
increasing demand for trading services. In addition, barriers to entry the trading business 
have been lowered, as electronic trading venues are less costly to set up and do not 
                                                 
6 For a review of these proposals, and their connections with analogous debates occurring in the fields of 
corporate and banking law, see Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition and Privatization in 
Financial Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL ENQUIRIES L. 2 (2001).  
7 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
2359, 2419 (1998). 
8 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of 
Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 922 (1998). 
9 See Jackson, supra note 6, at 13-14.  
10 However, the possibility that a different regulatory regime from the one built by the SEC might bring 
greater innovation to the U.S. markets remains open.    
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proprietary trading systems emerged seeking to take away market share from traditional 
exchanges. Moreover, electronic networks of communication provide much more 
efficient methods of dissemination of trading data and other information to financial 
intermediaries and investors. Additionally, market shifts have also had a large impact on 
the stock exchange industry. In particular, the increased share of market capitalization 
held by institutional investors and their rising participation in trading activity put 
pressures on the traditional trading system of exchanges that was modeled on retail 
trading. Institutional investors are interested in a trading environment where they can 
trade large orders directly with one another, to reduce the market impact of such orders 
and ensure anonymity and high speed of execution. Moreover, as trading fees and 
commissions represent a significant expense for investors with substantial trading 
activity, institutional investors pressed for lowering these charges. In parallel, new 
technological capabilities have led to a rise in the demand for cross-border trading, thus 
contributing to the overall increase in trading activity. Financial intermediaries, on the 
other hand, have also expanded internationally, have obtained memberships in multiple 
exchanges and trading venues, and have grown both through a larger network of clients 
and through increased consolidation in the investment banking business. As a result, they 
are now the receiving point for a large number of investors’ orders, which allows them to 
internalize orders more efficiently. Overall, these developments, which are characteristic 
of the modern era of global financial integration, were equally felt in the U.S. and 
Europe, but prompted different regulatory responses.      
Due to these trends, differences between the U.S. and Europe in the structure of 
the underlying U.S. and European markets grew gradually less important. In the U.S., the 
NMS included (until recently) only NYSE-listed stocks. Therefore, it covered a market 
characterized by the dominance of a major exchange, regional exchanges and Alternative 
Trading Systems (“ATS”) provided most of the competition, rather than dealers 
internalizing orders. In European countries, exchanges trade primarily in separate sets of 
stocks, mostly originating in each exchange’s local jurisdiction. Investment firms that 
internalize orders systematically and a few exchanges that issuers prefer for cross-border 
listings, such as the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) are the main source of competition 
for local exchanges, rather than ATSs.  
However, in both Europe and the U.S., competitive pressures on exchanges were 
of the same nature: regardless of their form (i.e., ATSs or dealers), competitors focused 
on offering services mainly to institutional investors. Moreover, in both Europe and the 
U.S., pressures on stock exchanges often resulted from client demands, such as the 
growing demand for cross-border trading or for lower transactions costs. The 
combination of new competitors and new client demands multiplies pressures on 
exchanges, as client pressures are sharpest when clients have the realistic option of 
defecting to a competitor.
11 However, regulation that creates barriers to order flow 
migration can stop such processes, as an exchange with greater liquidity becomes 
dominant and need not compete in other respects.   
                                                 
11  See A LBERT  O.  HIRSCHMAN,  EXIT,  VOICE, AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (discussing the circumstances under which dissatisfaction will lead to 
voicing protest within an organization, as opposed to exit from an organization).  
  8Moreover, in both jurisdictions, the exchange landscape is increasingly 
characterized by a few key exchanges. Increased consolidation among exchanges in 
Europe, with exchanges such as Euronext spanning a number of different European 
jurisdictions, has resulted in a reduction in both the number of separate sets of stocks 
being traded in Europe and in the number of competitors in the European exchange 
industry. On the other hand, the growing importance of Nasdaq-listed stocks and their 
inclusion in the scope of the National Market System is making the U.S. market resemble 
Europe a lot more; two major exchanges are in competition with each other, and each one 
is capturing the largest part of order flow in each of two separate sets of NMS stocks. For 
all these reasons, comparing regulation of European and U.S. markets is appropriate.  
 Although differences in the U.S. and E.U. equity trading markets have decreased 
over time, differences in the institutional framework for their oversight remain 
pronounced. Regulatory authority in the U.S. is concentrated in a single specialized 
administrative agency, the SEC, which is responsible for formulating policy goals, 
drafting legislation and carrying out enforcement. In Europe, legislation at the E.U. level 
is largely the result of a negotiation process among different states, steered by the EC 
Commission and finally framed with the participation of the European parliament. Even 
under the Lamfalussy process, which provides for uniform implementing regulation 
across the E.U., differences in the interpretation of the Directive and its implementing 
regulation by national authorities are expected to arise. Under existing European 
institutional arrangements, a high degree of political commitment among member states 
would be required to undertake an intensive and costly regulatory initiative such as NMS 
and its infrastructure.
12 However, the emphasis of this paper is not on the causes of 
market structure regulations, but rather on its effects. Regardless of the reasons that have 
prompted European legislation, and in particular the ISD and the Directive, towards a 
more deregulatory approach, this deregulatory policy has been pursued in Europe for 
sufficient time to produce discernible outcomes. This paper discusses these outcomes in 
comparison with the results of U.S. policy in the same field and uses conclusions drawn 
from this comparison to assess the effectiveness of recently adopted reforms in both 
jurisdictions.     
Part II.  The U.S. National Market System 
II.a.  U.S. Stock Markets in the Mid-1970s  
 
Before 1975, market participants determined the structure of the U.S. equities 
markets; no specific regulatory framework existed.
13 A series of potentially anti-
competitive practices adopted by U.S. exchanges, mainly the NYSE, brought market 
structure issues at the forefront of the regulatory agenda. This section presents the main 
                                                 
12 In general, negotiation processes often involve compromises with interest groups in different 
jurisdictions, and these compromises can lead to a sub-optimal outcome. On the other hand, member state 
concerns about sovereignty make them particularly likely to agree on limited supra-national regulation, 
which often rhymes better with deregulatory approach that leaves ample room for national variation. 
However, in certain cases a deregulatory approach may be more efficient than a heavily regulated regime.  
13 See Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s National Market 
System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 897 (1981). 
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reforms.  
The NYSE was then, and remains today, the largest stock exchange in the U.S. by 
market capitalization. Yet human interaction still drives the NYSE trading process; 
brokers trade directly with each other or with specialists on the floor of the exchange, 
which only members can access. A floor broker wishing to trade in a particular stock will 
go to the post of a specialist assigned to that stock, where she will either seek other 
brokers and negotiate a trade with them, or leave the order for execution with the 
specialist. Specialists form a separate category of dealers who are required to intervene 
and trade against the prevailing trend in case of excessive demand or supply so as to 
enhance the liquidity of the exchange floor.
14 In return for this service, specialists are 
granted the exclusive privilege to act as market-makers (including the right to post a bid 
and ask quote and profit from the spread) on the floor of the NYSE. Specialists, who may 
deal in their own account or as agents for brokers, charge brokers a fee for their services, 
thus reducing the overall profits of a broker from a particular order.
15  
Large corporations were predominantly listed on the NYSE. By 1975, all other 
U.S. exchanges were mostly trading in stocks listed on the NYSE, after having acquired 
an “unlisted trading privilege” by the SEC. Thus, all exchanges shared a common list of 
stocks and they competed for order flow. Fragmentation of order flow among a number 
of exchanges, however, reduces the number of orders that interact, diminishing liquidity 
and raising concerns as to whether all orders can be executed at the best available price 
across all markets.
16 In addition, fragmentation leads to higher volatility, as it creates 
additional imbalances in the interaction of orders, some of which may point in opposite 
directions.
17 Therefore, minimizing the effects of a fragmented market while preserving 
competition among marketplaces poses significant challenges to policy-makers.  
In the 1970s, the NYSE dominated stock trading in NYSE-listed stock. Over 80% 
of order flow was directed to the NYSE, providing this exchange with increased liquidity 
and a more dynamic bidding and asking process, which in turn resulted in better prices 
than those available in other exchanges. As a result, the NYSE led the price discovery 
process and competition with regional exchanges occurred on other parameters of order 
execution, such as transaction costs. The NYSE took advantage of its privileged position 
by engaging in a number of practices that put pressure on investors, if they were not 
openly abusive. For example, the NYSE commissions were calculated on the basis of a 
fixed amount per share, which harmed institutional investors trading in larger blocks. 
Overall, the dominance of the NYSE could was clear and problematic.   
   
                                                 
14 Specialists are under an obligation to trade so as to maintain “fair and orderly markets,” Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 §11(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78k(b) (2000).
15  See Nasser Arshadi, NYSE, Nasdaq, and Alternative Trading Systems: An Evaluation of the SEC’s 
Proposal Toward a National Market System, 7 FIN. MARKETS INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 1, 3 (1998). 
16 See Charles M. C. Lee, Market Integration and Price Execution for NYSE-listed Securities, 48 J. FIN. 
1008 (1993). 
17 See Ananth Madhavan, Market Microstructure: A Survey, 3 J. FIN. MKT. 205, 249 (2000). See also 
Iftekhar Hasan & Heiko Schmiedel, Do Networks in the Stock Exchange Industry Pay Off? European 
Evidence 11 (Bank Fin., Working Paper No. 2/2003, 2003) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=432582. 
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by the SEC 
 
Silver v. NYSE signaled the need to intervene in the equity trading market. The 
Supreme Court made clear that certain exchange practices regarding commission charges 
and member selection could come under the scrutiny of the anti-trust legislation, unless it 
was clear that exchanges operated under the oversight of the SEC.
18 Following Silver, 
Congress amended the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and authorized the SEC to 
eliminate anticompetitive stock exchange rules and practices and to establish a “National 
Market System,” i.e. a regulatory framework that would encompass the various U.S. 
trading venues. This mandate did not prescribe a specific market structure for the SEC to 
implement, but provided the agency with ample policy-making power in this area, limited 
only by the following objectives: economically efficient execution of transactions; fair 
competition between brokers, dealers, and among markets; availability to brokers, dealers 
and investors of information with regard to quotations and transactions; practicability of 
best execution; and opportunity for investors’ orders to be executed without the 
participation of a dealer.
19
Two principles motivated the Congressional mandate: all trading venues should 
be given a chance to compete with the NYSE, and all investors should be given a chance 
to execute their order against the best quote on the market. What does competition with 
the NYSE consist in, and what is the best quote for each investor? These questions were 
left to be answered by the SEC, which undertook the role of creating the NMS.  
The SEC’s response was straightforward. If information on trades and quotes 
became available to all market participants at the same time, and each order could be 
transmitted to the market offering the higher (or lower) price, the fragmentation effects 
would be lessened and investors would be well protected. If all markets could compete on 
the basis of best price, i.e. if all markets could receive information on the price discovery 
process of the NYSE and compete with it directly, then NYSE dominance would be 
curbed. In short, market transparency was thought to address both the complications 
posed by the fragmentation v. competition dilemma, and the need to limit NYSE 
dominance.
20 This solution is clearly attractive in its simplicity, but places considerable 
emphasis on a single dimension of competition among marketplaces: price. The SEC’s 
focus on price as the major source of competition among exchanges remains the most 
characteristic element of the U.S. market structure regulatory framework. 
In implementing the National Market System, the SEC did not rush to strike down 
any anticompetitive effects caused or practices established by stock exchange rules,
21 
arguing that the market would be mature for complete deregulation only when an 
information system linking all trading venues was fully established.
22 Thus, the SEC 
turned its attention to exercising pressure on market participants to cooperate so as to 
establish the infrastructure necessary for the National Market System, which was not 
                                                 
18 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
19 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 11A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78k-1 (2000).  
20 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-Regulation and the 
National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (2005). 
21 See Macey & Haddock, supra note 3, at  316.  
22 Id. 
  11complete until the late 1970s.
23 The first NMS infrastructure linkage established was the 
Consolidated Tape, a system of reporting to all market participants prices on already 
effected trades. Resisting the SEC’s initial suggestion for a system administered by a 
neutral body, NYSE and Amex proposed a plan that would be administered by a joint 
subsidiary of the two exchanges, SIAC, which would allow them to retain their profits 
from disseminating this information.
24 However, NYSE and Amex had little incentives to 
establish a viable, easy to use infrastructure for their competitors, let alone modernize the 
infrastructure to adapt it to technological developments.
25 NMS infrastructure rules often 
disadvantaged regional exchanges and thus provoked a considerable amount of 
criticism.
26 Thus, granting control over the NMS infrastructure to NYSE was perhaps a 
decisive moment for the implementation of the SEC’s policy.  
The real test for the concept of exchanges competing on price came with the 
implementation of another NMS linkage, the Consolidated Quotation System (CQS). 
Initially, all exchanges and third market makers were required to publish in the CQS firm 
quotations for each security in which they made a market: the price quoted was binding 
for them, provided the orders received did not exceed the quoted order size. At first, 
regional exchanges and market-makers tried to publish quotes competing with the NYSE 
ones, but NYSE brokers were usually able to match them and exceed them, thus 
redirecting order flow back to the NYSE.
27 NYSE competitors were soon reduced to 
trying to monitor the NYSE price discovery process and offering to meet the NYSE 
quotes, by developing electronic systems that changed their published quotes 
automatically to mirror movements in the NYSE prices. With little space left for price 
competition under these circumstances, the SEC limited the requirement to publish a firm 
quote to the primary exchange only, while other market centers had the option, but were 
not required to do so anymore.     
  The objective of the two systems described above was to disseminate 
information, either post-trade (to notify investors of current price levels) or pre-trade (to 
let them know what the best price on offer at the time was). Thus, the missing component 
for the completion of the NMS was a system that allowed a participant in one market, 
who saw a better quote in another market to which he had no access, to transmit his order 
for execution against that better quote. This link was provided by the Intermarket Trading 
System (ITS). The ITS can be accessed by all securities exchanges, market-makers and 
                                                 
23 The Intermarket Trading System, which completed the NMS infrastructure, was finalized in 1978. See 
History of the New York Stock Exchange, 
http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_1960_1979_index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).  
24  See Seligman, supra  note 2, at 87. The Securities Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC) is the 
operator of the Consolidated Tape and the Consolidated Quotation System. It is a subsidiary of the NYSE, 
which own 2/3 of its share capital, and Amex. Therefore, through SIAC, NYSE has a firm grip over the 
technological systems that bring the NMS into life. In a market structure where information linkages play a 
pivotal role, SIAC cannot be expected to operate as an objective third party. 
25 See Mendelson & Peake, supra note 2, at 447 (1994). 
26 See Seligman, supra note 2, at 89. 
27 See Michael Halling et al., Where is the Market? Evidence from Cross-Listings (EFA 2004 Maastricht 
Meetings Paper No. 4399, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556105. See also Cheol S. Eun & 
Sanjiv Saberwhal, Cross-Border Listings and Price Discovery: Evidence from U.S.-Listed Canadian 
Stocks, 58 J. FIN. 549 (2003).  
  12ATSs that trade in securities currently covered by the NMS.
28 Exchange members are 
required to avoid initiating a trade at a price other than the best quoted bid and offer (i.e. 
to “trade through” the National Best Bid Offer price (the NBBO)). In the event of a trade-
through, the market whose order was traded-through may submit a complaint to the 
market that initiated the trade-through, and, if the market participant in question cannot 
claim an exception to the rule, the effects of the order must be reversed so that all parties 
involved are in the position they would have been if the trade had been executed at the 
then prevailing NBBO price.
29    
 
II.c.  How Viable Was the SEC’s Twofold Objective? 
 
Interpreting competition among market venues as competition for offering the 
highest (or lowest) price to investors, as did the SEC, possesses an intuitive appeal. 
However, it is doubtful whether, given the circumstances then prevailing in the U.S. 
equity markets, building the U.S. market structure framework on the basis of price 
priority was a sound policy choice. Instead of spurring competition to the NYSE so as to 
limit its dominance, this policy underlined NYSE’s ability to produce the best available 
price in the market, which resulted from NYSE’s increased liquidity (i.e. increased 
market share) and guaranteed by the strength of its network.  
A network is a system that connects individual consumers of services, in the sense 
that the service may be enjoyed only through participation in the network. In a typical 
network industry, the more people use a service, the more it makes sense for others to use 
it as well, in order to make contact with existing users. Therefore, networks develop a 
self-reinforcing mechanism.
30 As a result, consumers would be willing to trade off higher 
quality of services offered by a small competing network, in order to gain access to the 
facilities of a larger network and the business opportunities it presents,
31 despite lower 
quality of services offered by the larger network. In an industry with network 
characteristics, perfect competition between industry participants is hindered from 
leading to optimality of services offered when a participant reaches a critical mass.
32  
The economics literature has long established that the stock exchange industry 
possesses network characteristics. Stock exchange trading consists in matching a selling 
and a buying order at a set price, and therefore the opportunities of a trader to identify a 
matching order increase with the number of orders entered in the system.
33 In other 
words, the greatest the liquidity of a stock exchange, the more likely it is that the prices it 
                                                 
28 Proposed Rule: Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126, at 11,127 
(proposed Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Proposing Release].  
29 See Proposing Release, supra note 28, at 11,133 n.40. 
30 See Hasan & Schmiedel, supra note 17, at 11. 
31 Id. at 12. 
32 See Alberto Cybo-Ottone, Carmine Di Noia & Maurizio Murgia, Recent Developments in the Structure 
of Securities Markets, in 2000 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 223, 245 (Robert E. 
Litan & Anthony Santomero eds., 2000). 
33 It is no coincidence that, in 2004, approximately 76.8% of the dollar value of the global equity trading 
has been concentrated in six exchanges: NYSE, Nasdaq, London, Euronext, Frankfurt and Tokyo. See 
World Federation of Exchanges, Domestic Equity Market Capitalization, FOCUS 34, available at 
http://www.fibv.com/publications/Focus105web1.pdf  (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).  
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was introduced, the NYSE controlled 85.34% of the trading volume in NMS stocks. 
Thus, NYSE’s market share posed enormous challenges for competitors wishing to 
attract order flow. Sure, quotes better than NYSE’s would occasionally appear in other 
markets; but the NYSE remained the market that led the price discovery process.
34 As 
discussed above, eventually its competitors had no other choice but to remain tied to the 
NYSE price discovery process, and even this proved hard for some. In addition, network 
economics suggest that the arrival of a new entrant offering marginally lower transaction 
charges to undercut existing trading venues is not as threatening. Thus, the possibility of 
marginally lower transaction charges in another trading venue would probably not be 
sufficiently tempting to attract order flow from the NYSE. Overall, network theory 
suggests that competing with the NYSE in terms of price would be extremely hard for 
other trading venues.  
It could be argued that, to some extent, the objective of the NMS infrastructure 
was to allow other trading venues to share some of the benefits of the network, and in 
particular its wide customer base. Moreover, the decision to direct orders to trading 
venues other than the NYSE was made easier for investors, who were reassured that, if a 
better price emerged in the NYSE between placement of the order with a broker and 
execution, they would be able to benefit from the NYSE price. However, in practice the 
NMS linkages did not work as smoothly. First, the ITS relied upon brokers and 
specialists to look to quotes posted in other markets and spot that there was a better quote 
available.
35 In addition, the process for transmitting orders to another market and 
obtaining a confirmation by that market was relatively time consuming, a problem that 
became gradually accentuated as technological developments reduced the speed of 
execution for automated markets. Finally, the enforcement mechanism of the current 
trade-through rule, which relies on a market-to-market complaint, proved to be 
inefficient.
36 Thus, the network effects in the stock exchange industry continued to work 
to the benefit of the NYSE.
37   
The difficulties to beat the NYSE price discovery process, as described above, 
have a number of consequences for assessing the soundness of the SEC policy in 
implementing the NMS. First, considerable time, effort and financing was invested in 
building an infrastructure whose impact on increasing the level of competition in the 
market could only be limited. Indeed, all studies show that the ITS was not used 
                                                 
34 In 2005, the NYSE provided the best quote in NYSE-listed stocks in 86.7% of all quotes for these stocks. 
The two major competitors to the NYSE were Archipelago Exchange, providing the best quote 7.8% of the 
time, and Nasdaq, providing this 4.6% of the time. See New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Market Quality 
– Best Price, http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/mktquality/1095517494175.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
35 See Seligman, supra note 2, at 94. 
36 See Letter from Thomas N. McManus, Managing Director and Counsel, Morgan Stanley, to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).  
37 Ruben Lee points out that the network effects characterizing the stock exchange industry should direct 
regulators’ concerns at the risk of a market participant acquiring monopoly powers through excessive 
consolidation of order flow, and not at market fragmentation. See Ruben Lee, The Future of Securities 
Exchanges 7 (Wharton Working Papers Series 02-14 2002), available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/02/0214.pdf  (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Professor Robert Ahdieh 
claims that in this context, regulation should actively undertake a “cueing” function, so as to facilitate 
transition to the market structure of the future. See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 215. 
  14extensively,
38 and that a large part of the trades directed through the ITS were actually 
transmitted for execution to the floor of the NYSE, and not away from it. The price 
discovery process continued to be concentrated to the NYSE. 
Apart from a waste of money and effort, however, the repercussions of the SEC’s 
policy choices for the structure of the market run much deeper. By making price priority 
the sole basis of its market structure regulation, the SEC automatically excluded all other 
dimensions of investors’ interests from any role in the regulatory framework it 
established. Indeed, there are cases where investors would opt for execution of an order at 
a suboptimal price so as to benefit from other characteristics of the trade. For example, 
institutional investors trading relatively illiquid stocks in large order sizes would like to 
avoid the “market impact” of their order on the stock price: release of a large order, 
which has to be broken down in smaller amounts so as to be fully executed, drives stock 
price down so that, by the time the last part of the order is executed, the stock price is 
much worse than it was in the beginning. Therefore, these investors prefer to trade 
directly between themselves, achieving a price that, although worse than the market price 
for the stock at the beginning of the transaction, is probably better than the average price 
per share they would achieve had they released their order in the market. Other investors 
prefer in a fast, electronic trading venue to the slower NYSE floor.      
The fallacy of the SEC policy choices on a theoretical level is also illustrated by 
the insights of network theory. Its conclusions regarding the reinforcing character of 
networks are based on the assumption that the quality of services offered and the price 
asked by new entrants is roughly comparable to that of the network. In other words, 
competitors on new entrants will be able to attract order flow if they are able to offer 
services of a considerably higher quality and/or at considerably lower charges. 
Competitors could also attract order flow, and thus compete with an established network, 
by offering services that are considerably different than those of the network
39 and 
possess characteristics that are particularly attractive to certain customers. Overall, in 
order to generate some initial order flow that could constitute an inroad into the 
established network’s liquidity, competitors need to turn to other dimensions of 
competing with the established network apart from price and rely on innovations that will 
allow them to either lower their charges or differentiate their services. By requiring 
investors to adhere to the trading venue offering them the best price even when they were 
primarily interested in differentiated services or lower charges, the SEC regulatory policy 
prevented competitors from taking full advantage of such innovations.      
The decision of the SEC to focus on price priority and disregard other dimensions 
of competition among exchanges effectively reinforced the dominance of the NYSE. The 
strongest advantage of the NYSE was its ability to offer better price. The SEC policy 
turned the NYSE advantage to a statutory benchmark that all other trading venues were 
required to adhere to. The benefits this system conferred to the NYSE became more 
pronounced with time, as technological advances led to the proliferation of private, 
electronic trading systems that allowed direct interaction among institutional investors 
and much speedier execution.  
                                                 
38 In 2004, ITS trades amounted to approximately 2% of the aggregate trade volume in NYSE-listed stocks, 
and approximately 4.6% of the NYSE trading volume. See New York Stock Exchange – ITS activity 2000 
– current, http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/Default.aspx?tabid=115.  
39 For example, ATSs offered anonymity to investors. 
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Part III.  The E.U. Investment Services Directive 
III.a.  E.U. Stock Markets in the Mid-1980s 
 
In the mid-80s, each E.U. country had its own stock market. European issuers 
raised capital mainly from investors in their country of incorporation and thus listed their 
stocks on a local exchange. As a result, European exchanges did not share a common list 
of stocks, as was the case in the U.S. The major exception to national segregation of 
stock markets in Europe at the time came in the form of cross-border listings: some 
European issuers would seek to attract resources outside their local market by listing both 
in their national exchange and at another exchange in Europe, most often the London 
Stock Exchange (the “LSE”).
40  
Apart from exchange floors, European equities were also traded directly between 
dealers. In 1986, the LSE introduced an electronic display facility where London dealers 
posted mandatory bid and ask quotes for a minimum order size, covering not only stocks 
already listed on the LSE, but also stocks listed on other European exchanges.
41 This 
system, known as SEAQ International, offered greater speed of execution and was better 
suited to absorb large orders from institutional clients. LSE succeeded initially in 
attracting considerable order flow, especially from large investors such as U.S. banks and 
investment funds, giving rise to hopes that London would become the first pan-European 
market. However, continental exchanges soon responded to the erosion in their order 
flow by overhauling their trading systems so as to offer comparable advantages.
42 It was 
not long before they managed to reverse the tide and “repatriate” order flow from 
London, whose SEAQ International market soon collapsed. These events set European 
exchanges on a course of fierce competition with one another, which would eventually 
transform equity trading in Europe. The Investment Services Directive was negotiated as 
the conflict between LSE and continental exchanges was drawing to a close.
43         
   
III.b.  The Investment Services Directive 
 
The Investment Services Directive (the “ISD”)
44 was mostly focused on firms 
offering broker/dealer services (termed “investment firms” by the ISD). It is known for 
establishing a “single passport” regime for these firms, which allowed them to lawfully 
                                                 
40 Marco Pagano, Ailsa A. Röell & Joseph Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why do European 
Companies List Abroad?, 12 (CSEF Working Paper, 1999), available at 
http://www.dise.unisa.it/WP/wp28.pdf. In the nine European exchanges that were the subject of that study 
(Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Milan, London, Madrid, Paris, Stockholm and Vienna), the total number 
of foreign listings increased only slightly from 732 in 1986 to 757 in 1991, and then declined to 625 by 
1997. 
41 Id.  
42 See infra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
43  See Benn Steil, The ISD and the Regulation of European Market Structure, in EUROPEAN  EQUITY 
TRADING 116, 116 (Benn Steil ed., 1996). 
44 Council Directive 93/22 O.J. (L 141), 27 (EEC) [hereinafter ISD]. 
  16operate in any E.U. member state without an additional licensing procedure, once they 
were fully licensed in one E.U. member state.
45 In order to ensure full integration of 
investment firms in the market of a host member-state, the ISD introduced the concept of 
the “regulated market,” under which most European exchanges would be classified, and 
mandated that full and fair access to these markets be granted by the host state to 
investment firms. Regulated markets were also granted a “single passport” by the ISD, 
which allowed them to establish facilities granting access to their market in other member 
states without additional licensing procedures.
46 Therefore, stock exchange regulation 
under the ISD was primarily directed towards facilitating the creation of a European 
single market in financial services, rather than establishing a market structure design such 
as the U.S. NMS. Market structure considerations, however, became part of the ISD 
agenda in two important respects: consolidation of order flow in national markets and 
transparency requirements for licensing regulated markets.  
The severe competition that continental exchanges, and in particular the Paris 
Bourse, had recently experienced from London’s SEAQ International, led a group of 
member states, led by France, to propose the concentration rule.
47 Under this rule, E.U. 
member states would be allowed to pass domestic legislation requiring that all 
transactions in securities listed on an exchange located in that state must be effected 
within an exchange, without breaching E.U. law principles on freedom to provide 
services. The proponents of the concentration rule argued that consolidation of all orders 
in a single trading venue, which the concentration rule undoubtedly achieved, would lead 
to greater liquidity and a more efficient price discovery process.
48 In addition, 
consolidation of order flow would provide investors with confidence that they were 
receiving the best available price in the market.
49 To the extent that they aim to avoid 
order flow fragmentation, these arguments had much in common with the theoretical 
foundations for the NMS in the U.S.   
While investors’ best interests were the justification for the concentration rule, the 
rule also assisted the E.U. member states who supported it to gain back order flow that 
had migrated to London.
50 After heated negotiations, the final ISD rule included a 
provision that gave investors, especially professional ones, the right to opt out of the 
concentration rule, subject to express authorization by the member state that had enacted 
such a rule for its national markets.
51 In addition, the rule applied only to investors 
habitually resident within that member state.
52 France, Belgium, and six other E.U. 
member states have enacted legislation that prohibits the sale of listed securities outside 
their exchanges.
53 To the extent that the concentration rule was actually implemented, it 
strengthened the segregation of European markets along national boundaries. However, 
                                                 
45 ISD, supra note 44, art. 14(1). 
46 Id., art. 15(4). 
47 Charles Goldfinger, ISD II Debate About the Trading Venue Diversity: The Tree and the Forest, 13 (Eur. 
Capital Mkt. Inst. Working Paper 2003), available at http://www.ecmi.es/readmore/goldfinger.htm.  
48 See Steil, supra note 43, at 116.  
49 See Guido Ferrarini, The European Regulation of Stock Exchanges: New Perspectives, 36 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 569, 584-585 (1999).  
50 Id.  
51 ISD, supra note 44, art. 14(4). 
52 ISD, supra note 44, art. 14(3). 
53 See Goldfinger, supra note 47, at 13. 
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proposals,
54 its effect on European markets remains doubtful.      
Market microstructure considerations also framed the ISD’s requirements on 
authorizing the establishment of regulated markets. As regulated markets were to be 
granted a “single passport” to establish access facilities throughout the E.U., they should 
comply with a minimum set of requirements acceptable to all member states, including 
transparency of the underlying markets, i.e. display of pre- and post-trade information. 
However, dealer-driven markets, where incoming clients’ orders, buy or sell, are 
executed against an intermediary, the dealer, who posts quotes on which he/she is willing 
to trade and holds an inventory of that stock, operate at different levels of transparency 
than order-driven markets, where clients’ orders are executed directly against one 
another. In less transparent markets, dealers have the incentive and the opportunity to 
price more aggressively at the early rounds of the session to obtain information on prices, 
thus keeping transaction costs down,
55 while in more transparent markets the inventory 
level of each dealer’s holdings in a certain stock is apparent to all, thus reducing their 
aggressiveness in quotes.
56 Instead, in order-driven markets prices are set by investors’ 
orders, and thus pre- and post-trade data are the main indication of price levels in the 
exchange. Therefore, any transparency requirements would in effect disadvantage dealer 
markets in relation to order-driven markets.      
As the LSE was, at the time, mainly a dealer-driven market, while continental 
exchanges were order-driven, a controversy over transparency requirements erupted. 
Continental member states insisted on immediate post-trade data disclosure, which, if 
endorsed, would effectively deprive the LSE from the “regulated market” status and the 
single passport.
57 Eventually, a mid-way solution was reached, where certain 
transparency requirements were imposed, but national regulators retained significant 
leeway to interpret and apply these requirements.
58 The LSE was required to introduce 
certain reforms to its post-trade data disclosure timeframe, so as to secure the “regulated 
market” status, but trading on the exchange was not disrupted.  
Thus, the regulatory regime for market structure in Europe, in the wake of the 
implementation of the ISD, looked very different from the U.S. regime. The order flow 
fragmentation considerations proposed in the context of the concentration rule debate 
were not elevated to a central feature of the European market structure system, not even 
with regard to shares listed in multiple exchanges. The quote and trade data disclosure 
controversy was limited to the type of information exchanges release and focused on the 
role of transparency in competition among exchanges, not in the investors’ decision 
making process.  
                                                 
54 See Guido Ferrarini, Exchange Governance and Regulation: An Overview, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES 
MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 245, 261 (Guido Ferrarini, ed., 1998).  
55 See Ananth Madhavan, Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the Disclosure of Trading Information, 8 
REV. FIN. STUD. 579 (1995). 
56 Professor Madhavan’s arguments were empirically confirmed by Professors Bloomfield and O’Hara, 
who conducted a computer simulation that included informed traders, noise traders who buy and sell 
arbitrary numbers of shares in each round and two human active traders who must raise or invest a 
predetermined amount before trading closes. See Robert Bloomfield & Maureen O’Hara, Market 
Transparency: Who wins and who loses?, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 5 (1999).  
57 See Ferrarini, supra note 49, at 580. 
58 ISD, supra note 44, art. 21(2). See also Ferrarini, supra note 49, at 581.  
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the terms of regulation that was eventually adopted, but to the market structure aspects 
that remained outside the ambit of regulation. Rules on orders’ price priority, the 
centerpiece of the U.S. market structure regime, were totally absent from its European 
equivalent, thus enabling European exchanges to later introduce reforms in their trading 
models that allowed different prices for the order-driven and dealer-driven segments of 
their market, as explained below.
59 Similarly, while order flow fragmentation 
considerations were discussed with regard to the international level, fragmentation within 
the confines of the exchanges, towards which European markets eventually evolved, were 
not ruled out even for the proponents of the concentration rule. Indeed, exchanges in 
countries supporting the concentration rule, such as France, provided for a separate 
segment of the market for executing large orders. The method of dissemination of 
information to investors, to which the U.S. invested significant effort and resources, was 
not included in the debate on data disclosure. These omissions are yet more impressive if 
considered in the context of the push towards financial markets integration that drove 
E.U. legislation at the time: one would expect that the more links between markets are 
established, the more integration will be fostered.  
A number of explanations for the divergence between the U.S. and the E.U. exist: 
the needs and level of maturity of European markets in the early 1990s may have been 
different, or the E.U. Commission may have lacked the power or the political backing to 
undertake such an initiative. Regardless of the rationale behind this divergence, the fact 
remains that, as competition among European exchanges was mounting, market structure 
issues remained largely outside the scope of regulatory initiatives at the E.U. level. 
Although member states were thus left with the authority to regulate market structure, it 
is unlikely that they would show any interest in regulating competition among exchanges, 
as in most of them the local equity trading market evolved mainly around a single 
exchange. Therefore, under the ISD regime, market structure aspects in Europe remained 
to a significant degree unregulated. Thus, market participants in the exchange industry 
were effectively granted wide flexibility to define the terms of their operation. As 
competition among exchanges was steering them through a decade that would transform 
completely stock trading, the flexibility of the European regulatory regime proved 
extremely valuable.  
 
Part IV.  Developments in the E.U. After the Investment Services 
Directive 
 
This section maps the developments in the European stock exchange market, 
starting at the time the ISD was negotiated and ending with the introduction of the 
Directive. The first part examines the various types of competition among exchanges, 
while the second part discusses how European stock exchanges sought to reform 
themselves in order to respond to competitiveness concerns.  
 
                                                 
59 See infra text accompanying notes [92]-[100]. 
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For the largest part of their centuries-long history, stock exchanges have been 
providers of liquidity: they had been offering to investors the ability trade their shares 
immediately. Thus, competition among exchanges was, primarily, competition for trading 
and order flow. In the last two decades, a number of new methods to attract order flow 
have been developed, mainly due to technological advances and the ensuing globalization 
of finance. As a result, competition among exchanges is now conducted on new 
parameters, although attracting order flow remains its focus.  
In the 1980s, European issuers already listed in their home country who sought 
additional means of raising capital often saw listing in another exchange as a channel to 
access the global financial markets, to boost their profile and increase their international 
recognition. As a result of cross-listings, some stocks were now concurrently trading in 
several European exchanges, which were thus set to compete directly among themselves 
for order flow. At this type of competition, the LSE emerged as a clear winner. As of 
December 31, 2003, 381 foreign companies were listed on the LSE (out of a total of 
2,692 companies), corresponding to half of the aggregate equity turnover of the 
exchange. European issuers represented 58% of the international equity turnover 
(corresponding to approximately 28% of the aggregate LSE turnover).
60 The numbers of 
issuers obtaining cross-listings in other European exchanges was limited. In 2003, 
Deutsche Börse had achieved an aggregate domestic equity turnover of €2,104 billion; 
however its foreign equity turnover amounts to just €173 billion.
61 Euronext also 
maintains its focus on the markets of the countries that formed it (France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal). As of December 31, 2003, 345 foreign companies were listed 
on Euronext (out of a total of 1,392);
62 however the aggregate equity turnover of the 30 
most active foreign companies amounted to just €12,250 million, compared to €936,930 
million for the 30 most active domestic companies. These data include companies outside 
the E.U. Where cross-listings exist, prices on the exchange of the primary and secondary 
listing are perfectly arbitraged,
63 leaving limited scope for disadvantaging investors that 
place the best quote in one of the two markets.  
As the data above show, the extent of cross-listing in Europe has remained rather 
limited, in comparison with the extent NYSE-listed stocks are traded in other exchanges 
in the U.S. Although the interest in cross-listing peaked in the early 1990s, by 1997 the 
number of issuers seeking to cross-list was already falling.
64 As direct competition for 
                                                 
60 See London Stock Exchange, Exchange: The Magazine of the London Stock Exchange (Dec. 31, 2003), 
27,  available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/48D3D4B0-05A5-4F88-A9C9-
CBEDDF970B09/0/2728.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). The aggregate equity turnover of the LSE for the 
year ending December 31
st 2003 remained equally divided between the domestic and the international 
market (£1,877 billion and £1,759 billion respectively). 
61 See Deutsche Börse Group, Factbook 2003, 15, available at http://www3.deutsche-
boerse.com/INTERNET/IP/ip_stats.nsf/(KIR+Factbook+Kassamarkt+E)/BD587F972E5DF758C1256E850
045DAEB/$FILE/Factbook_2003_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
62 See Euronext, Factbook 2003, 22, available at 
http://www.euronext.com/file/view/0,4245,1626_53424_165799057,00.pdf. 
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  20trading in the same stock is limited to cross-listed stocks,
65 levels of direct competition 
for order flow among European exchanges are low. Moreover, even the existing cross-
listings have rarely succeeded in attracting sufficient order flow in the host exchange so 
as to create an active secondary market there,
66 and therefore trading activity remained 
with the exchange of the primary listing. Given that the two markets are perfectly 
arbitraged, and thus trading in both markets takes place at the same time, this finding 
sheds some light on the role of price priority in attracting order flow away from the 
primary exchange.  
While demand for cross-listings was weakening in the mid-1990s, demand for 
cross-border trading was rising. The adoption of Rule 144A / Regulation S in the U.S. in 
the early 1990s, in combination with the increasing participation of institutional 
investors, led to the emergence of a new style of European offering that spanned a 
number of different jurisdictions on the basis of private placement exemptions from 
prospectus issuance requirements. With disclosure documents drafted using American 
prototypes, European issuers managed to address simultaneously institutional investors 
located in all major European financial centers as well as across the Atlantic, achieving 
desired liquidity levels without the need to cross-list in another market. This type of 
offering was often combined with an initial public offering and listing on the issuer’s 
local exchange or proceeded once the issuer was already listed on a local exchange.
67 The 
demand for cross-border trading was also strengthened by general factors relating to the 
European market at the time, such as the introduction of Euro, which eliminated foreign 
exchange risk within the Eurozone, and the increasing popularity of stock ownership as a 
method of financing, as evidenced by the rise in share ownership in many countries.
68  
This development had a series of significant consequences for competition among 
exchanges. First, the investors participating in the day-to-day trading in European 
exchanges were more sophisticated, were willing to trade in larger blocks of stock and 
were interested in maintaining low costs,
69 thus pressing for exchanges that had larger 
liquidity and lower costs of trading.
70 Moreover, institutional investors were interested in 
trading anonymously, so as to reduce the market impact of their orders, thus seeking less 
transparent markets.
71 In addition to changes in the investors’ profile, the brokers’ profile 
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  21was also changing: in order to avoid the costs of hiring local brokers, the large investment 
firms that conducted these offerings obtained membership in all major European 
exchanges.
72 On the other hand, retail brokers remained focused on their domestic 
markets. Overall, increasingly larger investors and brokers had more negotiating power 
towards exchanges.
73 Moreover, as the structure of the offering did not always 
contemplate a listing, more emphasis was now placed on the characteristics of secondary 
trading at the exchange where the issuer was listed.  
In order to absorb increased demand for cross-border trading, exchanges sought 
first to expand their network of brokers outside their home jurisdiction, by establishing 
electronic terminals in foreign countries that were connected directly with the exchange 
facilities. For example, at the end of 2004 Deutsche Börse maintained 283 remote access 
trading screens around Europe, of which only 144 were located in Germany.
74 Increased 
demand for cross-border trading added a new type of competition among exchanges that 
were now seeking to attract more foreign brokers. Pursuing a merger and/or alliance 
strategy was also a viable choice for exchanges seeking to expand beyond their 
jurisdiction: it would allow members of one exchange to trade in shares of other 
exchanges, thus reducing the need for financial intermediaries to employ additional 
broker dealers, in case they were not themselves members of that exchange.
75
  Perhaps the most important development resulting from the increased demand in 
cross-border trading has been the emergence of new types of competitors for order flow, 
i.e. trading venues that are not exchanges themselves. This will be further discussed 
below under (). 
 
IV.b.  Competition Among Exchanges Led to A More Efficient Trading System 
 
The development of SEAQ International triggered a chain of substantial changes 
in the trading model of European exchanges. The London Stock Exchange had 
successfully utilized modern technology by introducing trading facilities capable of 
attracting order flow to London. To respond, continental exchanges followed LSE’s lead 
in incorporating technological advances in their trading methods and gradually moved to 
electronic trading systems.
76 This path also led to greater convergence among the trading 
models of European exchanges.  
In 1986, the Paris Bourse (now Euronext Paris) was the first exchange to 
introduce a wholly electronic trading system, CAC, based on a central limit order book 
model, under which the exchange holds a book where all orders are entered and then 
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  22matched with one another.
77 For liquid stocks, i.e. stocks for which there are sufficient 
incoming sell and buy orders, trading is continuous, with the exception of call auctions at 
the beginning and the ending of the session. For these stocks, matching is achieved on the 
basis of strict price and time priority. For less liquid shares, continuous trading on the 
basis of price and time priority is achieved with the support of designated exchange 
members trading on their own account (i.e. as dealers), so as to absorb sell-side or buy-
side imbalances and provide additional liquidity. Alternatively, trading for these stocks 
takes place only at call auctions. There are some exceptions to these principles, most 
notably block trades, i.e. very large orders, that are executed outside the book, and trades 
where the same broker represents both buyer and seller.
78 By 1995, the Paris Bourse had 
introduced a series of technical upgrades to its trading model, renamed the NSC.
79  
In 1991, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange introduced IBIS, an electronic trading 
system connecting brokers and operating in parallel to the exchange floor for orders 
exceeding a certain size.
80 Thus, IBIS combined elements of both a dealer-driven system 
and an order-driven system. In 1997, IBIS was replaced by Xetra, an electronic order-
driven trading model for all orders, providing for automatic order matching and 
continuous trading, in addition to call auctions at the beginning and the closing, as well as 
twice during the session. Large orders can be executed outside the system by way of 
block trades, without being subject to any reporting requirements to Xetra.
81 With regard 
to less liquid stocks, Xetra has also utilized specialized exchange members, the 
“designated sponsors,”  to provide liquidity enhancement. Although the similarities 
between Xetra and NSC are numerous, some differences between the two markets also 
remain. The degree of specialized liquidity providers’ intervention in Xetra is greater 
than in NSC, as the aggregate number of designated sponsors is bigger, the number of 
stocks supported by designated sponsors is greater than in NSC and their regulation is 
tighter.
82 Moreover, Xetra competes with the floor-based system of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, as well as seven small regional exchanges.
83 In 2002, 85% of the aggregate 
equity trading volume in Germany was routed to Xetra. 
The success of continental exchanges led the LSE, where the dealership structure 
had always been the traditionally prevailing model, into a heated debate among its 
constituencies on the desirability of an electronic central-limit-order-book model. Finally, 
in October 1997, the LSE introduced, in parallel to its dealer- and quote-driven system, 
an electronic limit order book system,
84 the Stock Exchange Trading System (SETS). 
SETS covers the most liquid part of the LSE market, blue-chip trading.
85 Later, 
electronic central-limit-order-book trading was also expanded to stocks supported by 
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  23specialized liquidity providers. Overall, while the introduction of SETS moved the LSE 
towards an order-driven market, significant dealership elements still remain.     
Thus, over the course of a decade, European exchanges experienced a 
technological revolution that overhauled their traditional trading systems.
86 The most 
apparent achievement of this revolution was a sharp decline in transaction costs. In 
addition to reducing the work that a broker must perform to execute a trade to entering an 
order in a computer terminal, an electronic system practically eliminates the marginal 
cost of adding an extra trade to the market.
87 As a result, the overall efficiency of the 
financial system is increased. Electronic trading systems may now allow stock exchanges 
to accommodate much larger trading volumes than would have been possible in the past. 
Apart from revolutionizing the method of trading, new technologies allow quote and 
trade data to be communicated to brokers and investors quickly and efficiently. 
Moreover, exchanges that have adopted electronic systems of trading can more easily 
cooperate among themselves, and thus achieve critical mass that will allow them to enjoy 
network externalities.
88 Finally, access to stock exchanges and trading venues can now be 
provided on line, without the need for physical presence of the broker on the floor. 
Therefore, the importance of geographic location of the trader and the exchange has been 
greatly diminished,
89 and perhaps the only natural limitations that remain in this respect 
relate to time zone differences. Connectivity to the exchange floor was particularly useful 
to European investment firms, permitted under the ISD “single passport” to establish 
activities around the E.U. without undergoing any additional licensing process. 
In parallel to automating their systems, European exchanges also converged to a 
common trading model, characterized by central limit order book trading for their most 
liquid stocks (the largest part of their order flow), call auctions for the opening and 
closing of the trading session, and a dealership segment supporting less liquid stocks.
90 
The economics literature suggests that these models, characterized as “hybrid markets,”
91 
combine the benefits of both central limit order book systems and dealer systems, while 
also addressing some of the problems of each system. Traditionally, dealer systems were 
devised to tackle order imbalances, where supply on the sell-side is not sufficient to 
absorb demand on the buy-side or vice versa.
92 In a limit order book system, order 
imbalances are more likely to arise, as liquidity is constrained by the volume of orders 
already available in the market. Hybrid markets provide for methods to infuse additional 
liquidity in a limit order book system, by triggering a dealer-driven system for large 
trades
93 or illiquid stocks. This additional liquidity is particularly important to 
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  24institutional investors, who often wish to trade in large blocks and who are concerned that 
releasing a large order into the market will drive the price down.
94 Another advantage of 
dealer-driven systems lies in their ability to limit the negative consequences of 
information asymmetries for uninformed traders. While in order-driven systems an 
inappropriately high (or low) quote posted by an uninformed investor is likely to be 
executed as soon as a matching order is found, in dealer-driven systems prices are set by 
quotes posted by dealers, who, as the recipients of many orders on both the buy- and the 
sell-side, have inherently more information about price levels.
95 In hybrid markets, the 
dealership segment covers illiquid stocks where information asymmetries are greater, 
while the limit-order-book is utilized for liquid stocks, where information is quickly 
incorporated into price.
96 This advantage of hybrid markets is particularly important to 
small investors, who are likely to be less well informed.
97 Moreover, lower trading 
costs,
98 the main advantage of order-driven markets over dealer-driven markets, is 
maintained in hybrid markets, at least for the largest part of the order flow directed to the 
central limit order book.  
Overall, the incorporation of technological advances in the day-to-day operation 
of European exchanges, mandated by fierce competition among them, not only achieved 
a decline of transaction costs and an increase in efficiency, but also led to convergence, 
from a structural point of view, to a common improved trading model.  
  
IV.c.  Competition Among Exchanges Led to A More Efficient Organizational 
Structure 
 
Increased competition among exchanges created a new environment for 
organizations that had traditionally operated in a semi-monopolistic way within their 
national borders. The membership structure most exchanges had traditionally adopted 
was designed to protect the interests of their members in a guild-like fashion,
99 rather 
than respond to the needs of an international competitive environment. Moreover, the 
introduction and then constant upgrading of electronic trading systems required a 
significant investment of capital. Thus, European exchanges undertook to transform 
themselves into for-profit corporations, whose flexible decision-making process would be 
more responsive to their modern needs,
100 and sought to raise capital from the equity 
markets, often by obtaining themselves a listing in their own markets.
101 By the end of 
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  252000, Euronext, LSE and Deutsche Börse had completed their transformation to the 
corporate form. The ability to raise capital allowed exchanges to finance their projects to 
offer more efficient trading mechanisms, thus fostering growth in the financial services 
sector. Moreover, the move away from a membership structure to a corporate structure 
allowed management to disentangle itself from the interests of the members’ community 
and take into account the interests of other constituents, such as investors and 
shareholders.
102  
An additional advantage the corporate form conferred on exchanges was that it 
cleared the way for a merger and acquisition strategy. As discussed above, a merger 
between two exchanges would allow brokers to trade in each exchange’s stocks directly, 
thus eliminating a layer of financial intermediation and its associated costs.
103 Moreover, 
expanding their critical mass is a way for exchanges to strengthen their network through 
the increase of liquidity it entails. Finally, mergers in the exchange industry could take 
advantage of certain economies of scale, such as sharing costs for the development of a 
trading platform and maintenance of electronic trading systems.
104 The most successful 
form of cooperation for European exchanges has been to maintain separate exchange-
operating entities in each jurisdiction, which are the holders of the “regulated market” 
license, and to achieve consolidation at the trading platform level and at the holding 
company level.  
Until today, the most impressive attempt to bring together a number of different 
exchanges is Euronext, which resulted out of a merger between the Paris Bourse and the 
exchanges in Amsterdam and Brussels, to which the Lisbon exchange was added in 2002. 
The London-based derivatives exchange LIFFE has joined the Euronext group in 
2002.
105 The Nordic Exchanges Alliance (Norex) is another important grouping, 
currently including the stock exchanges of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, 
Estonia and Latvia,
106 led by the OMX holding company. Both Euronext and Norex 
follow the strategy of maintaining separate national licenses and sharing a common 
trading platform.  
 
IV.d.  Competition Among Exchanges, Alternative Trading Systems and 
Investment Firms 
 
As cross-border trading volume was increased, a number of enterprises outside 
the exchange sought to gain part of the order flow. Alternative trading systems (“ATS”) 
are proprietary, automated, screen-based trading systems that offer subscribers a variety 
of trading environments or facilities that may not be available in the organized markets. 
In the disaggregated, largely national, securities markets of Europe, ATSs hoped to 
capitalize on the ISD single passports and become the missing link that would 
consolidate trading interests in major European stocks in a single trading venue. 
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  26Addressed primarily to institutional investors, ATSs guaranteed anonymity and promised 
to accommodate large orders. While a number of ATSs have been established in Europe 
during the 1990s,
107 they have been largely unsuccessful. Contrary to the U.S., where 
ATSs offered to investors the advantages associated with electronic trading, ATSs in 
Europe had to compete with electronic-trading exchanges.
108 Often, brokers were used to 
working with the trading screen and operating system established by local exchanges and 
it was hard for ATSs to penetrate this chain.
109 Moreover, some brokers had taken 
advantage of the automation of exchange services to allow privileged access to the 
exchange to their large clients.
110 Although this practice raised concerns as to its 
compatibility with local laws and exchange access rules, it provided these clients with 
direct interaction with a much larger investors’ base than an ATS could have possibly 
provided. In addition, exchanges offered an integrated clearing and settlement service, 
which was not offered by ATSs.
  111 For all these reasons, the impact ATSs had on 
competition for order flow at the European level was not, eventually, significant.  
More direct competition to exchanges came from one of their constituencies, the 
large brokerage houses and investment banks. Investment and brokerage houses that 
bought and sold stocks outside the exchanges, for their own profit and for the benefit of 
their clients, was not a new phenomenon, as such a market existed for many decades, 
mainly centered in London. However, their importance was reinforced for a number of 
reasons. The ISD “single passport” for financial services
112 allowed brokerage houses 
that sought multinational presence to establish operations in various E.U. member states, 
sometimes also acquiring access to local exchanges. Also authorized to act as dealers (i.e. 
to obtain a proprietary position in stocks of their choice) under the ISD,
113 these 
brokerage houses formed a network separate from exchanges and spread around Europe. 
As demand for cross-border trading was increasing, dealers became more active in 
continental shares, as permitted by the concentration rule.
114 In particular, these firms 
have been increasingly engaging in the execution business, i.e. they have sought to 
accommodate internally, by trading against their own holdings, large orders of clients 
demanding immediate execution which, if directed to an exchange, would probably have 
to be fragmented in smaller bulks to avoid driving the stock price down (or up).
115 
Clearly, the larger the network of these firms becomes, the greater their ability to 
accommodate clients’ orders, as they may even receive matching orders from separate 
clients. By providing immediacy of execution, these firms, known as “internalizers,” are 
effectively providing liquidity and are thus in direct competition with exchanges. [How 
large is the dealer market in Europe?]     
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IV.e.  Levels of Competition, Market integration and Order Flow Fragmentation 
  
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, European exchanges moved from 
protection of semi-monopolies by national borders to direct competition with other 
exchanges, and then also to competition with other trading venues. At the same time, the 
national character of each separate market has not evaporated, as each exchange lists 
mainly stocks of issuers originating within its local jurisdiction (with the exception of 
LSE, which comprises a significant international market) and is served by the local 
brokerage community (with the exception of large houses that have established a 
European-wide presence). As a result, multiple levels of competition currently operate 
within the European market. First, exchanges continue to compete directly among 
themselves. This type of competition, as evidenced in the mid-1980s, has triggered 
significant changes in the exchange trading model. Today, direct competition among 
exchanges is more evident in their merger and alliance strategy, which manifests a quest 
to acquire critical mass before their other competitors. Moreover, exchanges compete 
with financial intermediaries, who are now able to internalize order flow. Finally, there is 
also competition of financial intermediaries through the exchange. Growth and success of 
an exchange continues to benefit its members, not as owners, but as holders of the 
exclusive rights of access to that marketplace. For brokerage houses that have not 
expanded their presence and their client network internationally, their future course is 
dependent on the future of the exchange, or on how their group of exchange members 
collectively fares against the group of members of another exchange. These three distinct 
levels of competition that take place in the European exchange industry form the forces 
that bring the various European markets closer to integration.   
At the same time, these various levels of competition in European markets lead to 
an increasing fragmentation of order flow. Traditionally, commentators claimed that 
fragmentation has not been a major concern for European markets, which were centered 
on the dominant exchange in each jurisdiction.
116 At present, however, order flow in 
European exchanges is fragmented between the central limit order book of the exchange, 
the dealership segment of the exchange (prices in which do not correspond to prices in 
the limit order book), the dealers operating outside the exchange internalizing orders, and 
any activity on ATSs or secondary listing exchanges, where relevant.    
 
Part V.  Developments in the U.S. Following the Implementation 
of the National Market System 
V.a.  The Development of Nasdaq 
 
The over-the-counter market operates outside organized exchanges. Here, stocks 
are traded directly between dealers posting their quotes and building their positions for 
their own account, initially without any facility for centralizing order flow and matching 
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  28orders. Nasdaq, an electronic trading system designed to serve the needs of that market 
begun its operation in 1971. It consists in a network of trading screens located around the 
U.S.
117 that was developed under the auspices of the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (“NASD”). Unlike regional exchanges, which have mainly focused on trading in 
NYSE-listed stocks, Nasdaq trades in a separate set of stocks not listed on the NYSE, 
which gradually grew to amount to approximately 4,000 firms today. Many of these 
stocks are highly liquid and would qualify for exchange-listing, but opted for trading on 
Nasdaq,
118 thus triggering fierce competition with the NYSE for listings.
119 As Nasdaq-
traded stocks were not included in the NMS,
120 the emergence of Nasdaq as a competitor 
to the NYSE took place outside the NMS framework and its limitations. In addition, 
Nasdaq also trades in shares listed on the NYSE and thus is the main trading venue for 
broker-dealers who seek to internalize order flow in NYSE-listed shares.
121
Academics have much debated the efficiency of trading on Nasdaq.
122 
Furthermore, the SEC’s regulatory actions, often motivated by academic research, have 
also aimed to increase efficiency, by increasing transparency and establishing order 
priority rules in this dealer-driven market.
123 In 2002, Nasdaq expanded its electronic 
communications system to include a trading platform, SuperMontage, which incorporates 
a facility for centralization and matching of orders. SuperMontage allows market makers 
and ATSs to post and display multiple quotes and orders at a single or multiple price 
levels and to opt for automatic execution, thus having their order directed to any market 
participant matching their quote.
124 Although the market participant placing the quote is 
identified in the trading screen, SuperMontage provides market makers the option of 
avoiding identification by designating a “non-attributable” order,
125 a feature of great use 
for investors who wish to maintain their anonymity while trading in large blocks. 
  
V.b.  The Development of the ATSs 
 
As early as 1969, the first fully electronic trading system had begun its operations 
and thus competed with exchanges.
126 Alternative trading systems (“ATS”) are 
                                                 
117 See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 754 (2004). 
118 See Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation Ahead of 
Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 758 (1999). 
119 See James D. Cox, Brands v. Generics: Self-Regulation by Competitors, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 15, 
16 (2000).   
120 A limited number of firms maintain a listing in both Nasdaq and the NYSE. 
121 See Dombalagian, supra note 20, at 1088. 
122 See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do Nasdaq Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 
49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994).   
123 As a full discussion of the developments in the Nasdaq market is outside the scope of this paper, I focus 
on the characteristics of the Nasdaq trading system as it stands today, prior to its inclusion in the NMS. 
124 See Nasdaq, Summary of SuperMontage 2, available at 
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader/hottopics/supermontage/smfuncdescription.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 
2006). 
125  Id. at 5. With the recent enhancement of the full anonymity feature, participants can work orders 
anonymously from order display through execution and clearing. 
126 See Ian Demowitz, An Exchange is a Many-Splendored Thing: The Classification and Regulation of 
Automated Trading Systems, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY 93 (Andrew W. Lo, ed., 1996).  
  29automated screen-based trading systems that offer subscribers a variety of trading 
environments or facilities that may not be available in the organized markets. They were 
initially developed to counter-balance exchanges in the era of fixed commissions,
127 and 
have since been customized to serve specialized customers, such as institutional investors 
and financial intermediaries and to provide "niche" services in equities, corporate debt 
securities, municipal and government instruments, or options.
128 Although alternative 
trading systems were already active at the time of the 1975 amendments, their role has 
become more prominent in the last 15 years. For example, while in 1999 they had 
attracted almost 4% of orders in NYSE-listed securities and 20% of the order flow in 
Nasdaq stocks,
129 in 2001 their market share on Nasdaq stocks had grown to 30%.
130  
The explanations for the success of ATSs range from efficiency justifications to 
notorious customer inducement practices. Institutional investors prefer ATSs because 
they often allow them direct participation in trading without an additional level of 
brokerage services. Moreover, as ATSs attract orders from professional investors wishing 
to trade in large blocks, the likelihood of matching a large order is greater and thus the 
market impact costs from releasing a large trade in the retail market are avoided.
131 On 
the other hand, payment for order flow practices, which consists in the trading venue 
paying a fee to the broker for orders directed to its marketplace, has also been the focus 
of many explanations for the success of ATSs.
132 Overall, ATSs have made their 
presence increasingly felt in the U.S. markets.  
   
V.c.  Developments in the NYSE 
 
The growth of Nasdaq and the increasing number of ATSs were only some of the 
factors that could, potentially, increase the competition NYSE faced. Additionally, the 
rising demand for cross-border trading and the growing participation of institutional 
investors resulted in increased trading activity, which represented a major challenge for 
any exchange operating a manually driven market on a trading floor. Not only is the 
capacity of the trading floor (and the brokers running it) subject to physical limitations, 
but also the cost of executing any additional trade is incremental, while for electronic 
trading systems physical limitations and costs of executing additional trades are not 
significant.
133 In addition, constantly evolving technology allowed operators of 
proprietary trading systems and electronic-run exchanges to offer even faster, cheaper 
and more efficient services to investors. As discussed above, these same developments 
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  30generated fierce competition among European marketplaces, triggering a series of 
reforms in the structure of European equity markets and the organizational form of 
European exchanges.  
Contrary to the European experience, characterized by waves of dramatic 
reallocation of market share among competing trading venues, the outlook of the U.S. 
market for this period is almost stable. Throughout the years, NYSE’s market share in 
order flow for NYSE-listed shares had remained effectively unmoved, gravitating 
between 75% and 80%.
134 Thus, while ATSs were relatively successful in capturing 
order flow from Nasdaq, they were not equally successful with the NYSE. The 
significant amount of liquidity already aggregated at the NYSE continued to attract order 
flow in the exchange, while its competitors turned on investors that were facing particular 
costs, such as market impact costs, and were interested in features such as greater 
anonymity and immediacy of execution, which the NYSE floor could not cater for as 
well. However, to the extent that these additional features, in combination with the lower 
liquidity of the other trading venues, resulted in a price inferior to the NYSE price, the 
NMS regulatory framework sought to redirect order flow to the marketplace offering the 
best quote, typically the NYSE. [Indeed, the overwhelming majority of trades that 
actually utilized the ITS was directed to, rather than out of, the NYSE] Thus, regulation 
provided an additional shield around the NYSE, allowing it to maintain its dominant 
position. 
In the thirty years from the 1975 Amendments to Regulation NMS, the changes in 
the NYSE system were not fundamental. In general, the NYSE remained faithful to its 
open outcry trading system, where orders are aggregated on the exchange floor. The 
NYSE did utilize technological advances in order to support its members’ day-to-day 
conduct of business on the floor and accommodate an ever increasing demand for trading 
activity, such as electronic order routing systems that allow members to communicate 
more efficiently with floor brokers and specialists.
135 For example, SuperDot, an 
electronic order-routing system used by NYSE member firms to send market and limit 
orders directly to the trading post where the security is traded, was introduced in 1984 
and is now used for 99% of the NYSE order flow.
136 While these systems facilitate order 
handling and, to some extent, affect brokers’ trading strategies,
137 they did not alter the 
character of the exchange as a system driven by human interaction. The only reform the 
NYSE undertook during that period that resulted in moving trading activity away from 
the floor of the exchange and towards an electronic trading system, was the introduction 
in 2001 of NYSE Direct+, an electronic trading system for the automatic execution of 
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  31small orders (up to 1,099 shares).
138 Automatic execution through NYSE Direct+ is 
optional, and is available only at the best bid and offer. At the moment, NYSE Direct+ 
has attracted almost 11% of the aggregate order flow of the exchange.
139 In summary, 
any reforms introduced between 1975 and 2005 sought to respond to outside 
developments while also maintaining human intervention as the driving force for the 
overwhelming majority of the exchange’s trades.   
This degree of reliance on human interaction on the exchange floor is even more 
impressive if contrasted with other important exchanges in the world. Of the five largest 
exchanges, the NYSE is the only one in which manual trading still captures such a large 
part of the aggregate market share.
140 The role of the floor community in handling NYSE 
order flow reflects, arguably, its role in the management of the exchange. Up to the 
Regulation NMS Proposal, the NYSE remained a membership organization controlled by 
the brokers, its members, who at the same time constituted its main source of income due 
to trading fees.
141 Exchanges that have remained, until today, faithful to the membership 
structure, have also managed to resist adapting their trading mechanism to technological 
evolution, and most notably remote membership.
142  
 
V.d.  Thirty Years since the Introduction of the NMS in the U.S. 
 
While general developments in the U.S. securities markets in the last thirty years 
may have been numerous, the overall outlook of U.S. market structure does not look all 
that different from what it looked like at the adoption of the 1975 Amendments. 
Throughout these years the NYSE has enjoyed almost undisputed dominance and has 
continued to attract overwhelming liquidity, despite increasing competition from a series 
of trading venues such as ATSs or Nasdaq. In particular throughout the 1990s, when 
European exchanges were introducing sweeping reforms in their trading methodology 
and ownership structure, the NYSE adhered to a trading model rooted in a long-bygone 
era. The NYSE was able to resist to changes for longer than other exchanges because of 
its continued dominance, due partly to the amount of liquidity it had already aggregated, 
and partly to the regulatory framework under which it operated. By requiring all trading 
venues to adhere to the best price available in the market for a certain stock, which in 
most cases would be the NYSE price, the NMS effectively diverted more liquidity onto 
the NYSE floor, even when such liquidity would have otherwise migrated to another 
trading venue. Thus, by failing to take into account the dynamics produced by network 
effects in the stock exchange industry, the SEC limited competition among trading 
venues and reinforced the dominance of the exchange.  
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  32Part VI.  Reform in the U.S.: Regulation NMS  
 
The SEC trumpeted its proposal for Regulation NMS as the most important 
reform in the U.S. market structure regulatory framework since the establishment of the 
NMS in 1975.
143 Motivated by developments such as the growth of the Nasdaq market, 
the rising market share of ATSs, and innovative trading technologies,
144 the reforms are 
intended to counter order flow fragmentation, promote equal regulation of market centers 
and greater order interaction, and increase displayed depth of trading interest.
145 The 
trade-through rule has been the most controversial aspect of the reforms introduced by 
Regulation NMS.
146 A hearing and two rounds of comments by market participants
147 on 
this rule prompted the SEC to re-propose the regulation.
148 The discussion below outlines 
the scope and the rationale of the trade-through rule focusing mostly on its final version, 
reveals problems in the justification of the rule offered by the SEC, and discusses the 
consequences of the SEC’s policy choices for the U.S. equity trading market.     
  
VI.a.  The Scope of the Trade-Through Rule 
  
The trade-through rule demonstrates the importance of price for the priority of 
execution of orders in the new U.S. market structure regime. The rule requires trading 
venues to establish procedures and policies reasonably designed to prevent the purchase 
or sale of an “NMS stock” at a price that is inferior to a price displayed in another 
market.
149 The category of “NMS stocks” is expanded by the proposal to cover stocks 
listed on Nasdaq, because many marketplaces besides the Nasdaq order execution facility 
now trade in Nasdaq stock, thus raising order fragmentation concerns. The requirement to 
establish anti-trade-through procedures applies, apart from exchanges and securities 
associations, to any type of trading venue, including ATSs, exchanges or OTC market-
makers, as well as to any broker or dealer executing orders internally. The rule applies 
equally to all firms intending to internalize order flow, even if internalization is not 
performed in a systematic way and no quotes on that stock have been published. 
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  33Moreover, orders of all sizes are included in the scope of the rule. Finally, the protection 
of the rule is not limited to the single best quote available across the NMS, but extends to 
the best quotes posted by each of the nine self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and 
Nasdaq.
150 Thus, according to the trade-through rule, once a trading venue posts the best 
bid or best offer quote on a stock, any order for that stock must be first routed to that 
trading venue for execution, at least up to the order size of the quote. However, the 
prohibition of trade-throughs is not absolute, in the sense that the SEC will not sanction a 
trade at a price other than the best bid or offer, once persuaded that all the necessary pre-
cautions were in place and the required level of diligence was exercised.
151
The main objective of the trade-through rule is to eliminate cases where, because 
trades originate from or are routed to separate trading venues, orders at the best price 
remain unexecuted while orders at worse prices are being executed. In the SEC’s view, 
such phenomena harm the interests of all investors, whether they place market orders (i.e. 
orders to execute the trade at the prevailing market price) or limit orders (i.e. orders to 
execute the trade once a threshold price is reached). When market orders are executed at 
a price other than the best price, investors’ confidence in the integrity of the U.S. capital 
markets is damaged.
152 Moreover, when limit orders at the best price remain unexecuted, 
the price discovery process is hindered and investors’ incentives to participate in that 
process by posting their limit orders are reduced. Stronger protection of limit orders will 
lead to more aggressive quoting by investors and market makers, resulting in increasing 
the liquidity of the U.S. capital markets.
153 Therefore, order flow fragmentation hinders 
the efficiency of the price discovery process and the best execution of investors’ 
orders.
154 [Liquidity providers (i.e. uninformed traders) may also pick market orders, 
while liquidity takers may also place limit orders.
155 Therefore, the premise that 
protection of limit orders necessarily enhances liquidity is false.] 
 
VI.b.  The Weaknesses of the Trade-Through Rule 
 
In order to counter order flow fragmentation, the SEC’s trade-through rule 
requires, in effect, execution of investors’ orders at the best price available in the market 
at that moment. In the SEC’s view, adequate investors’ protection can only be achieved 
through a principle that the SEC characterizes as “fundamental”: price priority.
156 
However, by effectively mandating the price of execution of all trades in all markets at a 
given point in time, the trade-through rule eliminates competition among trading venues 
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  34that post different quotes for the same stock. Explicitly recognizing the tensions that 
greater order interaction would produce for competition among trading venues,
157 the 
SEC characterizes the trade-through rule as a balancing act between greater competition 
among orders and greater competition among trading venues. However, it is doubtful 
whether the degree of order interaction without a trade-through rule is low, or whether 
there is considerable scope for competition among trading venues once competition on 
price is ruled out. The “meet or beat the quote” effect of the trade-through rule, which the 
SEC sees as order interaction, is in fact a signaling mechanism, aimed at alerting 
investors to the best opportunity available at the market at the time. Thus, it is clear that 
adequate and timely disclosure could produce equivalent results.
158 As to the remaining 
scope of competition among trading venues after the implementation of the price priority 
principle, the SEC points to other characteristics of trading venues, such as speed of 
execution or trading infrastructure. Nevertheless, the extent to which these characteristics 
can make a difference in an environment already dominated by the NYSE is 
questionable. As the attractiveness of the increased liquidity of the NYSE can only be 
curbed, according to network theory, with a combination of undercutting NYSE prices 
and developing superior quality trading infrastructure, the emergence of a credible 
competitor to the NYSE is unlikely. To the extent that the NYSE will continue to attract 
greater liquidity, its market will continue to generate the largest percentage of best 
bid/offer quotes. The trade-through rule transforms the liquidity advantage of the NYSE 
into the benchmark for order execution in the NMS. Instead of boosting competition 
among trading venues, the SEC policy openly favors the dominant exchange.  
Although initially the SEC had decided to provide investors with the ability to opt 
out of the trade-through rule, the final rule proposal did not include this option. In an 
attempt to accommodate the needs of professional investors for larger trades the SEC 
proposed a series of alternatives,
159 recognizing however that they cannot produce an 
equivalent outcome to an opt-out. The SEC defends its policy by arguing that investors 
with a long-term perspective will not be put off by small differences in trade execution, 
emphasizing also the benefits of inter-market price protection offered by the trade-
through rule for long-term investors. However, the SEC fails to mention the costs of this 
strategy, such as costs arising from the effect of large orders routed on the retail market 
on prices, which will be equally borne by all investors. The current U.S. trading 
environment will effectively oblige large traders to operate by retail market prices and 
techniques, thus blending two segments of the market that had so far preferred to operate 
on separate terms. Even trading models of individual exchanges premised on strict 
price/time priority principles, such as Euronext, provide for a separation between the two 
segments of the market in terms of price. By limiting trading choices for investors 
wishing to execute large trades and directing order routing to venues primarily designed 
for retail order execution, the SEC’s policy limits further competition among trading 
venues that offer different features and are addressed to varying types of investors.  
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  35The initial trade-through proposal sent shock waves throughout the financial 
services industry, resulting in more than 700 letters of comment to the SEC.
160 The main 
argument of opponents of the trade-through rule was, essentially, that the operation of 
market forces is sufficient to lead traders to the best execution for an order, provided that 
quotes are transparent and access to trading is not restricted by anti-competitive measures 
from market centers. The SEC’s reluctance to rely fully on market forces for the purposes 
of trading system design is based on its concern for the conflicts inherent in the agency 
relationship between financial intermediaries and investors and the potential for “free-
riding” on displayed prices by other markets. However, it is not clear whether these 
concerns are well-founded, or whether the trade-through rule represents the most 
effective method of addressing them. In particular, the SEC fears that financial 
intermediaries route orders to venues that better serve their interests, while investors are 
not aware of the inferior execution they receive and the resulting conflicts of interest. 
Still, the SEC notes that approximately 50% of the trade-throughs actually occurring are 
block trades, i.e. trades by sophisticated investors, who are likely aware they are 
receiving execution at a price other than the best price prevailing in the market at the time 
of the trade. In any case, the conflict of interest to which the SEC points could be easily 
resolved through increased disclosure, rather than through trading system reform. 
Moreover, the SEC claims that, by internalizing orders at prices inferior to prices already 
available elsewhere in the market, dealers trade in knowledge of the future direction of 
prices in the market, thus reducing the risk they are assuming. While dealers are thus 
“free-riding” on the price discovery process that limit orders in auction-driven markets 
(such as the NYSE) have contributed in building, the investors that placed these orders 
still see them unexecuted.
161 However, the trade-through rule requires dealers to either 
execute an incoming order against the best bid or offer on the market, or internalize the 
order by matching it; if the price is matched, the dealer continues to benefit from 
knowledge of the orders in another market, while the investors in that market must still 
wait for execution. To achieve its objective of protecting investors who place limit orders 
and eliminate “free-riding,” the SEC should have instituted time priority also (i.e. it 
should have required that, at the best price, the order placed first is also executed first). 
Therefore, the SEC’s portrayal of the trade-through rule as a solution to structural 
weaknesses of the exchange industry does not hold to scrutiny.   
Furthermore, the extent to which the SEC can achieve full consolidation of order 
flow in a market as diverse as the U.S. market, either through the price priority principle 
or through any set of regulatory measures targeted at the order execution level, is also 
doubtful. As the comments on Regulation NMS revealed, manual and automated markets 
competing for trading in the same stock could not be brought to cooperate so as to direct 
trades to the best quote available in either of the two, because of the different speed of 
execution each market offers. Thus, the SEC had to endorse the suggestion of 
respondents to the Proposing Release to limit trade-through rule protection to automated 
quotes only, as the delays associated with manual quotes were thought incompatible with 
modern technology.
162 Thus, quotes originating at the floor of the NYSE, currently the 
largest trading venue in the U.S., will not be protected. Although the amount of order 
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  36volume that will continue to be routed to the NYSE floor following the implementation 
of the hybrid model remains uncertain for the moment, it will probably constitute a 
significant gap in the NMS’ effort to consolidate all order flow in the U.S.. Even if all 
U.S. markets turned automated, however, there will still be considerable trading in U.S. 
stocks in trading venues outside the U.S. jurisdiction, such as in European exchanges, 
which will not be brought to participate in the NMS and blend with the U.S. order flow. 
Thus, the SEC’s objective of consolidating all order flow on NMS stocks is practically 
unattainable.  
 
VI.c.  Long-Term Policy Considerations Regarding the Trade-Through Rule 
 
While the precise effects of the trade-through rule, as described above, have been 
much debated during the lengthy consultation process that preceded its adoption, the 
wider policy consequences of a stricter price priority principle for the U.S. equity markets 
have not been equally discussed. By insisting on consolidation of order flow through a set 
of rules at the order execution stage and on the basis of price priority, the SEC takes a 
further step down the same policy it has followed since the inception of the NMS. It is a 
policy focused on a narrow perception of investors’ interests as limited to receiving the 
slightly higher execution price available in another trading venue, and on an overestimate 
of the ability of other trading venues to provide real competition to the dominant 
exchange. The SEC appears convinced that any dealer or trading venue has the choice to 
compete with the NYSE pricing process by simply posting a better quote. As long as 
there is nothing in the regulatory framework to eliminate that option, this framework 
cannot be characterized as overly interventionist. Thus, the SEC chooses to ignore that, 
even in a neutral regulatory environment, competing with the NYSE’s price discovery 
process is already hard due to its increased liquidity. Unless other trading venues increase 
the efficiency of their trading services so that, for investors, the benefits of moving away 
from the major provider of liquidity outweigh the costs, the likelihood of other markets 
producing consistently better quotes than the NYSE is extremely limited. The only other 
available option for NYSE competitors is to focus on the needs of particular categories of 
investors, which will prefer to use their services despite their inability to offer better 
quotes than the NYSE. However, the SEC-imposed principle of price priority requires 
other trading venues to at least match the NYSE price discovery process. Competing with 
the NYSE is simply made harder.    
Developments in the U.S. equity markets in the thirty years since the inception of 
the NMS illustrate the effects of the SEC policy. This policy has so far reinforced the 
dominance of the NYSE in the U.S. market, allowing it to withstand pressures for change 
in its trading system longer than any other large exchange. In general, the technological 
reforms introduced by the NYSE during that period aimed primarily at aiding its floor 
community to handle an increasingly larger order flow, rather than following the example 
of other exchanges that moved to a new more efficient trading model. Moreover, this 
policy has led to an antiquated and largely inefficient NMS infrastructure. Thus, while 
some orders may have achieved a better price than they would have otherwise achieved at 
that particular moment – even if price was not the main consideration of investors placing 
  37them – the long term interest of the investment community for a more efficient, 
innovative and dynamic trading mechanism was frustrated.  
However, just as the Regulation NMS proposal was being debated, the NYSE 
announced initiatives to establish an electronic trading system and to transform into a 
publicly-owned for-profit corporation, through a merger with Archipelago Holdings, an 
ATS operator. The following part looks at these reforms and discusses how they are 
designed to include the NYSE in the new price priority protection regime introduced by 
Regulation NMS.   
 
VI.d.  Regulation NMS and the NYSE Reforms 
 
The Proposing Release did not contemplate a distinction between quotes 
originating in automated markets and quotes originating in manual markets, thus 
extending trade-through protection equally to all markets.
163 Implementing that proposal 
would require automated markets, whose greater advantage was speed of execution, to 
wait for manually driven markets, such as the NYSE floor, in order to confirm the best 
bid/offer or respond to ITS messages for order routing. The SEC proposal, supported by 
the NYSE, was met with almost unanimous resistance from the investment 
community.
164 It was clear that the SEC would face great challenges if it decided to move 
forward with a proposal protecting quotes on prices reached through a slower process at 
the NYSE floor against quotes allowing for immediate execution in electronic trading 
systems. The alternative, the adoption of the price priority principle for electronic trading 
alone, would deprive the NYSE of protection under the NMS and sharpen competition. 
Therefore, the NYSE announced in the NMS hearings held by the SEC its intention to 
design and operate a hybrid market that would combine electronic and floor trading. 
Building upon existing NYSE infrastructure for the Direct+ electronic limit order book, 
the NYSE proposal envisages the abolition of the current order size limitation of 1,099 
shares, and introduces automatic execution for market and marketable limit orders up to 
the availability of the book, while the remaining part of the order will be routed for an 
auction at the specialist’s post on the exchange floor.
165 Thus, the proposal aspires to 
maintain a role both for floor brokers, who will be responsible for any part of an order 
remaining unexecuted following automated matching, and specialists, who will have the 
right to supplement liquidity and engage in market-making both through the electronic 
limit-order book and through residual orders directed to them.
166 Almost exactly a year 
following the NMS hearing, NYSE announced its merger with Archipelago Holdings, a 
group operating an electronic trading system, which would transform the world’s largest 
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  38exchange into a for-profit corporation.
167 At the same time, the implementation of 
Regulation NMS, technically in effect since August 2005, has been informally delayed by 
the SEC to allow marketplaces, including the NYSE, time to incorporate in their trading 
systems the procedures required by the trade-through rule.  
The change of scope in Regulation NMS, which limited the trade-through 
protection to automated quotes and thus disqualified the NYSE floor from price priority 
protection, played a part in accelerating reforms at the NYSE. At the same time, the 
NYSE has been experiencing a drop it its market share, which has slipped in the last six 
months to almost 73%, underlining the case for reforms. Although the SEC may take 
pride in encouraging the modernization of the trading system in the largest exchange in 
the world, the fact that regulatory intervention was necessary for a major market player to 
upgrade its level of services demonstrates the degree to which U.S. regulation has curbed 
the operation of competitive forces in the stock exchange industry. Despite a series of 
factors which have been mounting pressure on the trading and operational models of 
exchanges, ranging from technological developments to increased institutional investor 
participation in the market,
168 the NYSE had managed to resist any demands for change 
in its trading model, for at least as long as the previous market structure regime lasted. 
Moreover, the implementation of the hybrid market proposal is hoped to assist the NYSE 
in maintaining the leading position it currently holds in trading on NYSE-listed stocks. If 
it proves successful, as it is very likely, the U.S. market will continue to be dominated by 
an exchange concentrating the lion’s share in NMS order flow. Under Regulation NMS, 
the advantages conferred to the dominant player by its greater liquidity will be much 
increased, as the new trade-through rule imposes stricter adherence to price priority. 
Therefore, the lack of flexibility of the U.S. market structure regime in responding to 
competitive pressures is perpetuated. 
 
Part VII.  Reform in the E.U.: The Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive 
VII.a.  A New Approach to Securities Regulation in the E.U.  
 
It is not surprising that, following a decade of relentless changes in the stock 
exchange industry in Europe, the European Commission undertook the initiative, in the 
context of its Financial Services Action Plan, to replace the ISD. In its motivations for a 
new directive in its proposal, the E.U. Commission cited increasing competition among 
exchanges, confusion relating to allocation of regulatory powers among national 
authorities (such as in the case of cross-border mergers between exchanges) and an 
outdated investor protection regime.
169 In addition, the E.U. lacked a harmonized regime 
                                                 
167 See Joint News Release by the New York Stock Exchange and Archipelago, New York Stock Exchange 
and Archipelago Exchange Agree to Merge (April 20, 2005).  
168 See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Investment 
Services and Regulated Markets, Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and European 
Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC, at 10, COM (2002) 625 final (Oct. 19, 2002) [hereinafter 
Commission Proposal]. 
169 Id. at 23. 
  39for new types of trading venues such as alternative trading systems. As these concerns 
imply, market structure considerations have a central role in shaping the regulatory policy 
of the new directive, in comparison to their limited weight in the context of the ISD. This 
change of focus marks a new era for European securities regulation, which no longer 
seeks simply to facilitate market access for firms and investors across the E.U., but also 
to boost cross border activity by creating a framework in which firms and investors can 
have greater confidence.
170 This new philosophy was also associated with a reform in the 
regulation-producing technique through the adoption of the so-called “Lamfalussy 
process,” under which the role of directives is to provide directions of general policy, 
which will then implemented in secondary legislation by other E.U. bodies.
171  
   
VII.b.  The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
172
 
Following the emergence of new competitors to European exchanges, and the 
reform of their trading models to incorporate dealer-driven trades (such as block trades), 
the risks associated with fragmentation of order flow became pressing for European 
investors. In addition, the abolition of the concentration rule by the Directive could drive 
more trades out of the exchanges, leading to further fragmentation of the order flow.
173 
The Directive’s strategy for countering order flow fragmentation concerns is primarily to 
increase transparency of markets (i.e. information available to investors), as well as to 
reform best execution requirements for investors’ orders by brokers.
174 This part looks at 
the provisions of the Directive and then discusses similarities and differences with the 
U.S. National Market System.   
 
VII.c.  Transparency Framework 
 
The Directive imposes separate transparency requirements for each type of 
trading venue. Apart from regulated markets the Directive recognizes two additional 
broad categories of trading venues: multilateral trading facilities (“MTFs”) and 
                                                 
170 See Niam Moloney, New Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law: From Market Construction to Market 
Regulation, 40 COMMON MKT. L .REV. 809, 824 (2003). 
171 This body is the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). As a result of the requirements 
of the Lamfalussy process, the provisions of the Directive will sound less detailed than those of Regulation 
NMS in the U.S., as the SEC formulates and implements regulatory policy on a single level. However, the 
comparability of the two regulatory instruments is not affected, as they both incorporate the principles of 
regulatory policy in the market structure area.  
172 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Markets in 
Financial Instruments Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive 93/22/EC, O.J. (L 145), 1. 
173 See Goldfinger, supra note 47, at 14. The alignment of supporters behind the two conflicting views on 
consolidation of order flow is not surprising. French banks, who do not have particular expertise in 
dealership markets and who wanted to preserve their market share in Euronext-listed stock through a 
requirement to channel all trades through the exchange, argued in favor of consolidation. London dealers, 
who saw in the abolition of the concentration rule an opportunity to expand in markets they were 
previously prohibited from entering, supported the Commission’s proposal. 
174 Commission Proposal, supra note 168, at 14-15. 
  40systematic internalizers. MTFs, the Directive’s equivalent to alternative trading systems 
under U.S. regulation,
175 may be licensed either as investment firms or as regulated 
markets
176 and can thus operate throughout the E.U. once licensed in their home member 
state. Systematic internalizers, on the other hand, are those investment firms that execute 
clients’ orders outside an exchange on an organized, frequent and systematic basis
177 
either by crossing the order against the firm’s own position in that stock, or by crossing it 
against the order of another client. For each of these categories of institutions, the 
Directive establishes pre- and post-trade disclosure requirements. 
At the pre-trade stage, regulated markets and MTFs must disclose, on a 
continuous basis during normal trading hours, current bid and offer prices and the depth 
of trading interests (i.e. the size of orders) at those prices as available in their systems.
178 
The Directive contemplates that the extent of compliance with this obligation by 
exchanges may vary in accordance with market type (especially for markets with 
dealership elements), order size and method of execution (i.e. when trades are executed 
outside a limit order book).
179 Although the details of the disclosure obligations are left to 
be set by secondary legislation, it is clear that the quotes published by regulated markets 
are firm, and that the best bid/offer quote in the system will be included in any case. 
Moreover, systematic internalizers must publish a quote for stocks on which they execute 
orders internally,
180 on the basis of which they are obligated to trade for orders up to the 
average order size for that stock. As with MTFs, internalizers’ quotes should be made 
public on a regular and continuous basis during normal trading hours, and may be freely 
updated. The flexibility accorded by the Directive to systematic internalizers in terms of 
execution price is evident in the exemptions it provides from the firm quote obligation. 
The Directive explicitly allows trading at prices better than the investment firm’s quote or 
different than the prevailing market price for orders from professional clients or very 
large orders analyzed in a series of smaller trades for execution.
181 In addition, the 
Directive does not require investment firms to trade with any investor willing to accept 
their quote, despite the public character of the quotes. On the contrary, systematic 
internalizers are free to limit access to trade in their quotes only to investors of their 
choice, on the basis of criteria such as investor credit status or counterparty risk.
182 The 
difference in approach with the U.S. system, whose major concern is to ensure that all 
investors have access to the best price in any trading venue, is striking.  
                                                 
175 The Directive defines MTFs as systems that “bring together multiple third-party buying and selling 
interests in financial instruments in a way that they result in a contract.” Directive, supra note 172, art. 
4(1)(15).  
176 In this respect, the Directive follows the same path that the SEC followed through Regulation ATS, 17 
C.F.R. § 242.300 (2005). 
177 Directive, supra note 172, art. 4(1)(7). 
178 Id. at art. 44(1). 
179 Id. at art. 44(4). The Directive leaves the range of bid and offer quotes and, most importantly, the depth 
of interest that will be made public to be determined by the level 2 measures for which the Commission is 
authorized.  
180 Their obligation to publish a quote covers all stocks admitted to trading in a regulated market in which 
they internalize trades on a frequent and organized basis and for which there is a liquid market. Directive, 
supra note 172, art. 27(1).  
181 Id. at art. 27(3). 
182 Id. at art. 27(5). 
  41The post-trade transparency regime is also characterized by a significant degree of 
flexibility. While exchanges and MTFs are generally required to make public the price, 
volume and time of transactions executed through their facilities as close to real-time as 
possible, national regulators may allow for deferred publication of transaction 
information in case of very large orders.
183 This exemption underlines the fact that the 
trading systems of European exchanges provide different terms for the execution of large 
orders. For systematic internalizers, who are also required to make public the volume and 
price of the transactions they conclude and the time at which they were concluded, the 
timeframe set by the Directive for publication of transaction data is flexible, demanding 
publication only as reasonably close to real-time as possible.
184
While setting out the content of transparency requirements for trading venues 
constitutes one of the major aspects of the new European regime, the Directive does not 
seek to regulate the process through which the information to be made publicly known 
will become available to investors. Although establishment of a system for dissemination 
of pre- and post-trade data was discussed during the drafting stage of the Directive, it was 
ultimately decided not to create one, as most exchanges have established their own 
information dissemination systems.
185 In addition, there are already a number of private 
suppliers of trade data in the market, who provide investors with immediate access to 
prices in various exchanges and trading venues.
186 Thus, the Directive is limited in 
imposing a general obligation on member states to monitor that the dissemination of 
information takes place on reasonable commercial terms. In addition, the Directive seeks 
to facilitate systematic internalizers in performing their publication obligations by 
authorizing them to enter into agreements with exchanges to utilize the exchange 
reporting systems for publication purposes.
187 The expectation that the enhanced 
transparency requirements of the Directive will be served by a “market-led” solution
188 is 
contrasts with the SEC’s effort to build special infrastructure for this purpose, but 
developments in the market since 1975 justify the Directive’s approach.  
The transparency provisions of the Directive were one of the most controversial 
negotiation topics prior to the Directive’s adoption, due to their potential to affect 
competition among trading venues. A high degree of transparency is beneficial for a 
central-limit-order-book market, where the investors setting the prices with their 
incoming orders need as accurate pricing information as possible. On the contrary, the 
dealers (i.e. systematic internalizers) setting prices by posting their quotes and executing 
orders against their own holdings of stocks would be disadvantaged if their stock 
ownership levels were disclosed. Member states who felt that their exchanges were 
                                                 
183 Id. at art. 45(1). 
184 Id. at Art. 28(1). 
185 See Clive Wolman, Public Policy, Regulation and Market Data Provision: Developments in the U.S. 
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CESR/04-261b, June 2004). 
  42threatened by the expansion of trading through order internalization, pressed for higher 
transparency requirements, especially at the pre-trade level. The final content of the pre-
trade transparency requirements was formulated at the European Parliament, where a 
series of amendments towards greater flexibility were introduced.
189   
The E.U. Commission’s proposal explicitly refers to price differentiation between 
trades in the same securities executed simultaneously in different markets as the main 
risk that the new directive seeks to counter.
190 In this respect, the Directive shares 
common policy goals with Regulation NMS. For the drafters of the Directive, the 
regulatory response to order flow fragmentation comes through a new transparency 
regime that will encompass all trading venues
191 and thus provide investors with the 
information they need to make sound trading choices. Increased transparency will allow 
investors to take advantage of the provisions facilitating access to various trading venues, 
already established under the ISD and refined in the Directive. Again, transparency for 
investors and access to the various trading venues are the rationales of the National 
Market System as well. At this point, however, the Directive’s regulatory intervention in 
market structure stops; the Directive does not take the extra step to prohibit concluding 
trades at prices other than the best available price. Moreover, the Directive does not 
envisage a specific infrastructure for the purposes of disseminating information to 
investors or for the interaction of orders placed at different trading venues, such as the 
NMS infrastructure.  
 
VII.d.  Best Execution Framework 
 
The contractual relationship between a broker and his clients is characterized by 
the obligation to achieve the best possible execution of a client’s orders. A violation of 
best execution requirements would give rise to a private claim by the client against the 
broker and, in many jurisdictions, an administrative sanctioning process against the 
broker by regulators. Price of execution is one of the main parameters on the basis of 
which a broker’s compliance with the best execution requirements is assessed. Therefore, 
although best execution requirements are founded in the internal relationship between a 
                                                 
189 The draft directive proposal circulated to industry participants for review did not include any pre-trade 
transparency requirements. Before the release of the final Commission Proposal however, the matter 
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190 Commission Proposal, supra note 168, at 10. 
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  43broker and his client, their operation seeks to reassure that the broker will adhere to the 
market forces leading to the choice of the best execution alternative over all other 
available options. As the main concern arising out of order flow fragmentation consists in 
the added difficulties for achieving best execution of an order in a fragmented market, a 
legal obligation of the broker to that direction reinforces the broker’s incentives to seek 
actively for the best alternative.  
In setting the content of the best execution requirement in a concrete manner at 
the European level, the Directive made an additional step away from market access 
facilitation provisions to substantive legislative initiatives.
192 The Directive’s approach 
on assessing best execution of clients’ orders by investment firms is to identify how the 
orders of a particular client could be executed in the most appropriate way, rather than to 
impose an inflexible measure of best execution of general applicability. In particular, the 
Directive requires investment firms to identify the characteristics of the trade that are 
important for that investor, and the trading venues that would best suit these 
characteristics. Moreover, the order execution policy of the firm must be explained and 
approved by the client before the firm carries out the client’s orders. This part looks at the 
best execution regime of the Directive in more detail.  
Price is not the single trade characteristic that investment firms must consider 
when routing investors’ orders for execution. The Directive requires investment firms to 
“take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result for their clients taking into 
account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any 
other consideration relevant to the execution of the order.”
193 The intention of the E.U. 
Commission was to avoid an “absolute best execution obligation”
194 by mandating 
investment firms and national regulators to take into account a number of characteristics 
of the trade other than execution price.
195 An “absolute best execution obligation” would 
render the Directive’s policy choice for a multi-faceted market structure regime 
ineffective, as it would narrow substantially the broker’s choices of order execution 
venues. The proposals for E.U.-wide secondary legislation on this provision
196 avoided 
suggesting particular weight for each of the trade characteristics mentioned above, on the 
basis of regulators’ estimates of their relative importance, but sought to provide a clear 
and exhaustive list of criteria for weighing these factors,
197 including the characteristics 
of the firm’s clients, their orders and the trading venues to which their orders can be 
directed.
198 The flexibility thus accorded to investment firms and regulators in the context 
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  44of the best execution regime will allow taking into account factors such as implicit costs, 
which would include the impact large orders have on the stock price in some trading 
venues. These costs often drive professional investors trading in large blocks to request 
immediacy of execution from their investment firm. Overall, the objective of the 
Directive is to define more accurately what best execution consist in for each investor, 
while also providing a sufficiently clear yardstick to regulators to measure the investment 
firm’s compliance with its obligations.  
As the number of alternative trading venues provides investment firms with many 
choices for order execution, the Directive seeks to ensure that trading venues’ terms of 
access are fair for all firms wishing to explore trading opportunities in their markets.
199 
However, the Directive does not require that all investors’ orders have access in all 
trading venues, either by establishing a system interconnecting trading venues (similar to 
the ITS in the U.S.), or by simply requiring investment firms wishing to trade in a certain 
stock to acquire access to all possible execution venues where that stock is traded. On the 
contrary, for an investment firm to comply with its best execution obligations towards its 
clients, it is sufficient to have access to trading venues whose features serve best the 
characteristics of the firm’s trades, so that they consistently lead to the best result for its 
clients.
200 Therefore, investment firms targeted at specific categories of investors could 
provide access only to the trading venues that are most appropriate for these 
categories.
201  
As an understanding between investors and their brokers is essential for the 
operation of the Directive’s scheme, the Directive introduces a formal requirement for 
investment firms to provide appropriate information to clients about their order execution 
policy and obtain their prior approval.
202 Given that best execution will be assessed on 
the basis of a number of different factors, investment firms must also be able to 
demonstrate to their clients at the post-trade stage that their orders have been executed in 
accordance with the firm’s best execution policy. The current secondary legislation 
proposals for the implementation of this requirement suggest that brokers must provide 
information to clients about the execution venues to which the firm has direct access, the 
factors and criteria the firm uses to select execution venues, as well as any “inducements” 
to the firm in connection with the carrying out of clients’ orders, such as payment for 
order flow.
203 Thus, the degree of control investors are expected to have on the selection 
of trading venues for execution of their orders under the Directive is substantial.  
Tailoring best execution requirements to each investor’s profile is the main 
objective of the Directive’s regulatory framework, bringing it in stark contrast with 
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  45Regulation NMS and the trade-through rule. Where Regulation NMS prohibits all trading 
at a price different than the best available price, the Directive explicitly permits such a 
trade and recognizes the possibility that it could represent an execution option preferable 
to some investors. Where Regulation NMS mandates the aggregation of all orders at a 
central system ensuring full interaction of investors’ orders, the Directive allows 
investment firms to abstain from trading venues that do not serve their clients’ interests. 
For Regulation NMS, an order’s point of entry into the trading system should be 
irrelevant for achieving best execution, while for the Directive it is the subject of 
negotiation between the brokers and their clients. Therefore, in terms of defining what 
constitutes best execution of a client’s order, the divergence between the E.U. and the 
U.S. regime is great.  
 
VII.e.  The Directive’s Rationale 
 
The European market structure regime, following the implementation of the 
Directive, will look substantially different from the U.S. regime. Below, I argue that the 
Directive’s approach was shaped by greater confidence in the potential of competitive 
forces to bring efficient outcomes in market structure, based on the experience of the past 
decade in Europe, and by a more accurate assessment of the level of integration of trading 
venues.  
The Directive’s policy to establish a market structure regime characterized in 
general by low levels of regulatory intervention, and in particular by the absence of any 
rules on allocating order flow among trading venues on the basis of execution price, is 
rooted in the history of competition among marketplaces in Europe in the last decade. 
The lack of a concrete market structure regime in Europe, either before or after the 
adoption of the ISD, allowed European exchanges to undertake significant reform efforts 
so as to offer higher quality services and thus maintain or increase their market share. The 
aggregate result of this effort was to increase the efficiency of European markets, by 
incorporating technological advances that increased speed and quality of execution, 
converging to a common trading model that is highly efficient, and introducing structural 
reforms in the governance of the exchanges that allow for more flexible management. In 
other words, competitive forces that were left to operate unconstrained by any strict 
regulatory framework led to a revolution in the exchange industry whose major 
beneficiaries were investors and investment firms.   
A characteristic of the European regime in the last decade, in comparison to the 
U.S. regime, has been the lack of well-defined rules as to the effect of execution price on 
choice of trading venue. An established price priority principle would not have allowed 
competition among London’s SEAQ-I and continental exchanges to take off, as London 
prices were consistently different than those in continental exchanges because of the 
premium charged by London dealers for immediacy of execution.
204 Moreover, strict 
price priority rules would not have allowed European exchanges to develop their trading 
models so as to offer to retail and professional investors separate segments of their 
market where different prices prevail for the same stock.
205 Finally, the case of cross-
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  46listed stocks, where it was shown difficult to create an active market at the exchange of 
the secondary listing because of the increased liquidity in the primary exchange, 
demonstrates the power of the price priority principle to shield market venues 
characterized by increased liquidity from competition.    
Building on the lessons derived from the evolution of competition among 
European exchanges in the last decade, the Directive follows an approach that does not 
seek to minimize differences among trading venues, but to reinforce them. On the one 
hand, the investor protection regime seeks to ensure full cooperation between brokers and 
investors as to choice of execution venues and to tailor best execution obligations on 
clients’ needs so as to lead to the most effective choice of trading venue. On the other 
hand, increased transparency requirements seek to ensure that investors and their brokers 
will receive all relevant information before routing an order to a trading venue for 
execution. The decision to launch an order at a trading venue not offering the best price is 
not seen as abnormality, but as reliance on a characteristic of that trading venue other 
than actual price per stock – provided it does not constitute a violation of best execution 
obligations. Thus, investors and brokers are not viewed as passive actors who transmit 
orders in an all-encompassing trading system, but as active market participants seeking 
the most appropriate execution solutions for their orders. In general, the European regime 
is characterized by an effort to keep regulatory intervention in market structure aspects at 
a minimum, leaving to market forces the task of identifying the ideal solution for order 
execution. 
In addition, the technical developments that have revolutionized the stock 
exchange industry in Europe have also enhanced the capability of market institutions to 
integrate order flow on the basis of information alone, without support from special, 
centrally mandated, technical infrastructure. As all exchanges now have introduced 
automated trading, they are able to offer easy access and remote membership to 
investment firms around Europe. Exchange mergers and alliances have also expanded the 
reach of investment firms that maintained membership in one of the exchanges involved. 
All these developments offer, in effect, to European investment firms the ability to obtain 
membership in more than one European markets, to follow developments in the European 
markets in which they are members and to route an order for execution in any of these 
markets. In practice, the developments in the European markets in the last decade have 
given rise to a network of technical connections between exchanges and investment firms 
that provides the same functions that the ITS seeks to provide in the U.S. but in a more 
efficient manner.   
 
Part VIII.  Lessons from a Comparative Look at U.S. and E.U. 
Market Structure  
VIII.a.  The Role of Competition in the Two Regimes and Its Effect on Innovation 
 
Market structure regulation in Europe, especially under the ISD, imposed limited 
constraints on exchanges and other market participants. With the exception of the 
restrictions imposed by the concentration rule, to the extent implemented by member 
states, and the transparency requirements imposed by the ISD, investors and financial 
  47intermediaries were able to route their orders to the trading venue of their choice. In 
addition, the European framework removed any regulatory barriers for exchanges seeking 
to establish trading activities in other member-state jurisdictions, opening the way for the 
expansion of remote trading screens around the E.U. and thus facilitating access to major 
European exchanges. Thus, decisions as to where an order should be routed, and the 
considerations shaping these decisions, were entirely left to the discretion of individual 
investors and their traders. Given the flexibility of this regime, it is not surprising that 
fierce competition among European exchanges led to dramatic reallocations of order flow 
several times during the last twenty years. In addition, the lack of concrete market 
structure regulation avoided favoring one exchange over others. The transparency 
requirements under the ISD, which had initially raised concerns of bias in favor of 
auction-driven markets, were eventually tailored to avoid major disturbances in local 
trading systems, and the reforms the LSE undertook to comply with them did not affect 
its competitive position. In general, European exchanges were able to and did engage in 
competition with one another, and with other trading venues, on all possible dimensions. 
Under this regulatory framework, the competition generated among European 
exchanges by developments in technology and the increasing globalization of finance, as 
outlined above, led the European equity trading industry into its most radical 
transformation since stock exchanges were first created. Trading has become automated 
in all major European exchanges, which have converged in a common, and arguably 
efficient, trading model. To finance their investment in trading technology, European 
exchanges have become for-profit corporations and have often sought a listing in their 
markets. They have expanded their reach beyond their local jurisdiction by engaging in 
mergers and alliances, and they have diversified their businesses by establishing 
derivative trading facilities. As a result, European exchanges today appear particularly 
strong.  
Parallel developments in the U.S. have not been as spectacular. NYSE’s 
dominance in trading activity on NYSE-listed stocks posed significant challenges for 
potential competitors hoping that, by offering more efficient trading techniques, they 
would be able to undercut the attractiveness of NYSE’s liquidity and price discovery 
process. The SEC’s insistence on the price priority principle, which underlies the 
National Market System, favored NYSE’s ability to offer better prices due to its 
improved liquidity and thus strengthened its advantage over its competitors. Thus, instead 
of creating opportunities for competitors to divert order flow from a largely inefficient 
exchange, the NMS erected barriers to order flow already migrating out of that exchange. 
As a result, despite the development of the Nasdaq market and the continuing evolution 
of ATS’s trading systems, the NYSE was able to resist competitive pressures and 
maintain an archaic trading system. The change in the SEC’s policy signaled by 
Regulation NMS, which will now protect automatic quotations only, prompted reforms at 
the NYSE that are hoped to help it catch up with its European competitors. However, 
Regulation NMS further reinforces the price priority principle, thus maintaining an 
additional advantage for the trading venue with the highest liquidity. Perhaps the next 
round of reforms in U.S. trading systems will also have to be triggered by an SEC action 
mandated by developments in other parts of the world. 
  
  48VIII.b.  Can a Deregulatory Approach to Market Structure Succeed? 
 
NMS’s strategy in achieving order flow integration consists in creating a network 
that connects competing trading venues (the NMS infrastructure) and setting the 
principles under which orders interact with each other (price priority). However, market 
developments in the last fifteen years suggest that market forces have provided 
substitutes for both these regulatory tools. These developments are more clearly 
observable in the European markets, where they operated independently of a strict 
regulatory structure.  
The major goal of a communication network amongst trading venues, such as that 
created by the NMS infrastructure, is to allow orders placed by a broker in the market 
where she is a member to be executed in the market offering the best execution, even if 
that broker is not a member there. European financial intermediaries, on the other hand, 
have obtained membership arrangements with the trading venues most relevant for 
execution of trades in stocks for which they typically receive orders for in various ways. 
In terms of geographical reach, exchanges now count investment firms from all around 
Europe amongst their members through their remote access facilities. Exchange mergers 
and alliances have also provided brokers with access to additional national markets and 
separate sets of stock. Benefiting from the ISD passport, investment firms have 
established operations in multiple member states. In fact, some brokers receive 
sufficiently large order flow to develop a profitable internalization business, thus 
providing themselves competition to exchanges and ATSs. If a broker is not a member to 
a trading venue, the Directive mandates that trading venue to grant ad hoc access in terms 
similar to those applicable its members. Moreover, private providers for information 
collect and supply trade data in a highly specialized manner.
206 Thus, a network 
connecting trading venues would be of limited use in a market where all necessary 
connections are already established, maintained and constantly being updated by their 
primary beneficiaries. Instead, the Directive’s focus is on transparency, which will 
provide financial intermediaries with the information they need to route orders to the 
most appropriate trading venue. By relying on solutions already provided by market 
forces, the Directive avoids measures that favor certain trading venues to the detriment of 
others, while also minimizing the costs of regulation.  
With regard to principles of order interaction, the decision to reinforce the price 
priority principle, as set out in the trade-through rule, has been the most controversial 
aspect of Regulation NMS. The SEC has gone into considerable efforts to ensure that 
investors will always receive the best price, even if this entails delays in the execution 
process or favoring some trading venues over others – even if investors themselves may 
be indifferent to whether they are getting the best price. In stark contrast, the E.U. regime 
views price priority as simply one parameter investors and their brokers may take into 
account when considering which trading venue better serves their execution strategy. 
Determining best price includes consideration of various factors, such as order size, 
trading costs, market impact, and other implicit costs such as lost opportunities to trade 
pending execution. Thus, the Directive mandates disclosure of the broker’s order 
execution policy to investors and seeks to achieve an understanding between them as to 
                                                 
206 In fact, the Directive requires member states to make sure that such data are available to the public on “a 
reasonable commercial basis.” See Directive, supra note 172, art. 27, 28, 29, 30. 
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venue. While price will remain the most important aspect of best execution for the largest 
part of the investment community, investors that prefer a trading venue because they see 
an advantage other than price will also be free to pursue the execution strategy of their 
choice. Thus, by assigning order interaction decisions to investors and their brokers, the 
Directive allows a whole set of considerations to guide order interaction, thus responding 
to whole set of investors’ needs, as opposed to just one, price.  
As a result, a deregulatory approach to market structure can succeed. With a 
communication network provided by market participants and a more nuanced approach to 
order interaction, a deregulatory approach effectively contributes to market structure all 
the elements that must stricter regulation mandates. At the same time, a deregulatory 
approach maintains flexibility for incorporating in the market structure design constantly 
emerging innovations that affect both communications techniques and decisions on order 
interaction.  
 
VIII.c.  Implications for Academic Debates on Competition and Innovation  
 
Both scholars arguing for greater regulatory intervention in securities markets and 
proponents of a free-market approach have criticized the SEC’s policies in establishing a 
National Market System. Lessons drawn from a comparison between the U.S. and the 
E.U. experience are significant for both sides of this debate for several reasons. First, 
empirical results can supplement arguments based on theory and ideology alone. Second, 
cross-jurisdictional comparisons illustrate how radically different solutions from those 
the SEC has considered might work in practice, and provide details on how market 
participants actually respond to incentives and when they innovate.    
For supporters of a more pro-active role for regulation in the securities industry, 
the SEC’s efforts to implement the National Market System did not go far enough. These 
commentators would favor an all-encompassing electronic system that would introduce a 
price/time priority rule, where, among quotes at the best price, the earliest one to arrive in 
the system would be executed first.
207 They do not view the SEC as the designer of this 
system, but rather as a coordinator among market participants
208 and as a regulator ready 
to force the industry to push ahead, if necessary.
209 They criticize the SEC for not 
undertaking this role actively, although the 1975 Amendments granted it such authority. 
However, contrasting this view on the potential of the SEC to instigate market innovation 
with the developments in the European industry during that same period highlights its 
weaknesses.
210 It is hard to imagine a public body pushing the industry through a 
transformation as radical as that of the European equity markets, which included trading 
model overhaul to automation of markets and even a new organizational structure. At 
best, the SEC could ask for reforms once it saw markets in other jurisdictions pushing 
ahead; however, one cannot expect the SEC to be thinking about how to surpass other 
markets. Moreover, the failure of SIAC to provide efficient infrastructure for the National 
                                                 
207 See Seligman, supra note 2, at 133. See also Mendelson & Peake, supra note 2, at 443.  
208 See Seligman, supra note 2, at 134. 
209 See Mendelson & Peake, supra note 2, at 443. 
210 For an analysis of that “cueing” function of the SEC, see Ahdieh, supra note 1.  
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of an SEC-encouraged or coordinated initiatives undertaken by some market players on 
behalf of the whole market. On the other hand, competition among marketplaces instills 
in market participants the initiative to improve the quality of their services and respond 
more successfully to investors’ needs, as discussed above. The lack of substantial 
progress in the trading methodology employed by the NMS marketplaces, and in 
particular the NYSE, between 1975 and 2005 suggests that criticisms of the U.S. regime 
as overly restrictive of competition are well placed.
211  
Competition among trading venues in the European market structure regime bears 
many similarities to the type of competition envisaged in the reform proposals of 
Professors Romano, Choi and Guzman.
212 The Directive grants investors and financial 
intermediaries flexibility to choose a trading venue for their orders, taking into account 
the set of rules under which their orders will be executed. As the negotiations for the ISD 
and the Directive have shown, E.U. member states have aligned their interests with the 
interests of the major exchanges in their jurisdiction and have adjusted their national 
regimes to accommodate the reforms marketplaces instituted. Thus, by choosing an 
execution venue, investors choose the regime that will govern their transactions, just as 
Romano, Choi and Guzman propose for securities offerings. Choi and Guzman point in 
particular to the challenges for the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, such as 
difficulties in enforcing U.S. rules in foreign jurisdictions, the risk of interfering with a 
foreign country’s regulatory system and the inability to regulate effectively every 
transaction that somehow impacts American investors.
213 At the equity trading level, a 
National Market System aiming to consolidate all order flow on stocks trading on U.S. 
exchanges faces similar challenges, as many U.S. stocks trade in foreign exchanges, and 
vice versa.
214 Therefore, the hope to aggregate all order flow in a single market system is 
as ill-fated as the desire to regulate all securities offerings that somehow impact 
American investors. On the other hand, the deregulatory approach of the European 
market structure regime has allowed trading venues to develop their own order 
interaction rules that have sought to accommodate a wide range of investors. Moreover, 
the achievements of European exchanges, especially when contrasted to limited progress 
made by U.S. counterparts, are evidence of the success of regimes based on investor 
choice.
215  
                                                 
211 See Beny, supra note 5.  
212 See infra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
213 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 8, at 916. 
214 In 2005, the aggregate equity turnover of U.S. companies in the LSE had exceeded £509.3 billion, 
corresponding to trades in 30.6 billion shares. See London Stock Exchange, Secondary Markets Factsheet 
(Dec. 2005), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/06FDC8A5-526D-4052-9AAC-
7C22C087D61E/0/SecondaryMarketFactsheet0512.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). There are currently 80 
U.S. companies traded on the LSE, all of which are listed on a U.S. exchange. See London Stock Exchange, 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/pricesnews/prices/International+companies/usa.htm (last 
visited Feb 16, 2006). In comparison, the total trading volume of NYSE for stocks of companies 
incorporated in the E.U. (including the EEA) for 2005 amounted to $381.5 billion, corresponding to 11.6 
billion shares. See New York Stock Exchange, 2005 Non-U.S. Trading by Country, Region, 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/vbr05_jan1006.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
215 The success of European markets in establishing linkages among themselves, as well as with brokers 
located in foreign jurisdictions, and the parallel development of private providers that disseminate 
information quickly and efficiently, raises concerns about the overall necessity of an issuer choice regime, 
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Part IX.  Conclusion   
 
The comparison between the U.S. and European regulatory regimes on market 
structure, discussed alongside the effects of previous regulations on the underlying 
markets, illustrates the consequences regulatory policy choices have on innovation. In 
Europe, competition among exchanges has led the stock exchange industry towards a 
radical transformation that allowed it to take advantage of the innovative trading and 
communication techniques made possible by technological advances. In the U.S., such 
reforms were delayed by a decade and were introduced only after substantial pressure by 
the federal regulator. Regulatory policies favoring major market players inhibited 
innovation in the U.S., while a deregulatory policy that allowed competition to operate 
unrestrained fostered innovation in Europe. This analysis indicates that the SEC’s 
decision to strengthen its adherence to the price priority principle, which confers an 
important advantage to the competitor with the greatest liquidity, will further endanger 
future innovation in the U.S. equity trading markets. 
Finally, a parallel analysis of the U.S. and the European approaches to market 
structure regulation leads to a broader conceptualization of investor protection. Often in 
securities law the significant impact of technical issues on market behavior focus 
regulatory debates on implementation details rather than on the underlying policies. For 
example, the SEC’s concerns underpinning Regulation NMS were concentrated on 
potential losses for an individual investor whose order was not executed, while another 
order in another marketplace was executed at an inferior price. Opponents of the SEC’s 
plans often pointed to costs of a delay of some seconds necessary for verifying that no 
superior price orders were awaiting execution in other markets. Such arguments add 
value to regulatory debates; however, viewing regulation from the perspective of 
individual trades, they lose sight of the long-term implications of policy choices. For 
investor protection the wider repercussions of regulatory policy choices are equally 
important. In other words, regulations focusing solely on arguments about individual 
trades run the risk of missing the forest for the trees. Ultimately, U.S. investors would 
have been the greatest beneficiaries of increased innovation in the U.S. markets.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
similar to that envisaged in the Romano, Choi & Guzman proposals. To the extent that investors can access 
secondary markets cheaply and efficiently through these links, regardless of their respective locations, the 
level of integration an issuer choice regime hopes to bring to the market may be achieved through 
secondary market integration. This question remains to be explored by further research.   
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